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New methods and evidence
We develop the Probability Scaling Method, which rescales short-window announcement
period returns; and the Intervention Method, which uses returns associated with intervening
events, to estimate value improvements from tender oﬀers. These methods address biases
in conventional techniques, which measure only a fraction of the total tender oﬀer gain; and
which include revelation about bidder stand-alone value. Perceived value improvements are
much larger than traditional methods indicate; we cannot reject the hypothesis that bidders
on average pay fair prices for targets. Furthermore, our new methods aﬀect inferences about
economic forces in the takeover market. We ﬁnd several eﬀects (higher combined bidder-
target stock returns for hostile oﬀers, lower for equity oﬀers, and lower for diversifying oﬀers)
that reﬂect diﬀerences in revelation about stand-alone value, not gains from combination.1 Introduction
Attempts to estimate the value eﬀects of takeovers face two important challenges. We call
the ﬁrst challenge the truncation dilemma. Since not all takeover bids succeed, a short
event window that extends only a few days past the bid announcement date estimates only
a fraction of the value eﬀects of successful takeover.1 A long window that extends through
successful completion of the transaction can capture the full eﬀect on value. However, this
comes at the cost of introducing much greater noise and return benchmark errors.
The second challenge, which we call the revelation bias, is that the bidder’s return on
the announcement date reﬂects not just news about the value to be derived from combi-
nation, but news about the stand-alone value of the bidder. For example, ﬁrms sometimes
deliberately time the announcement of takeover bids to be simultaneous with unrelated
announcements.2 More importantly, as discussed further in Subsection 2.1, the very fact
that a ﬁrm makes a bid will usually convey information to investors about the bidder’s
stand-alone value.
To address these issues, we estimate the stock market’s perception of value improvements
from tender oﬀers using both conventional abnormal stock returns at the time of the initial
bid, and two new approaches. In our comprehensive 1962-2001 sample, all approaches
imply substantial value improvements. Furthermore, the new methods imply estimates
of shareholder value improvement that are much larger than those implied by traditional
methods.
The ﬁrst new method, the Probability Scaling Method (PSM), uses returns associated
with the announcement of the initial bid. Like most past studies, the return cumulation
window extends only a short time after the event. PSM then adjusts returns derived from
this short window upward to reﬂect the probability that the oﬀer will fail. It addresses the
truncation dilemma by exploiting ex post information about frequency of success to capture
the missing slice of the gains from takeover.
The second new approach, which we call the Intervention Method (IM), extracts infor-
mation about value improvement from the stock returns associated with intervening events
such as the announcement of a competing bid. Like PSM, IM addresses the truncation
1More precisely, it estimates a probability-weighted mixture of the gain from takeover by the ﬁrst bidder
and by a possible later bidder that may appear, where the total probability of acquisition is less than one.
2The WSJ reported: “It’s Wall Street’s version of ‘Wag the Dog.’ Over the past week, both Mattel
and Coca-Cola have announced acquisitions on the same day they also issued warnings about disappointing
earnings. ... No one is suggesting that either company unveiled its acquisition solely to divert attention
from its problems... But it is also clear that the acquisitions, like the [Iraq] bombings, helped shift attention
away from other less favorable developments.” The article gives other examples as well (WSJ, ‘Heard on
the Street’, 12/18/98, p. C1).
1dilemma through appropriate scaling of returns. At the same time, IM also addresses the
revelation bias, which taints estimates of the gain to takeover in past market and accounting
studies. A disadvantage of IM, however, is that it relies heavily on the subsample in which
an intervening event occurs such as arrival of a competing bid.
The development of the probability scaling and the intervention methods, and the use of
these methods to estimate underlying value improvements from tender oﬀers, are the main
contributions of this paper. We ﬁnd that value improvements from tender oﬀers are on
average perceived by investors to be positive and substantially larger than estimates from
previous studies. Conventional combined abnormal returns and the PSM estimate are pos-
itive in 71% of the sample (694 out of 976 transactions). In the competing bid subsample,
the IM estimate is positive in over 93% of the sample (132 out of 141 competing-bid trans-
actions). In both the general and the competing bid samples, the conclusion that takeover
improvements are on average positive and substantial is robust with respect to several alter-
native model speciﬁcations and plausible variations in the estimated parameters, and holds
in all subperiods. Using traditional event-period weighted-average returns as in Bradley,
Desai and Kim (1988), hereafter BDK-88, yields a combined mean (median) improvement
of 5.3% (3.7%) of combined bidder-target value. PSM estimated value improvements tend
to be considerably larger— a mean of 7.3% (median 4.6%) of combined value.
Value improvements are particularly large in the competing bid subsample. The aver-
age estimated IM improvement in this sample is approximately 13.1% (12.4%) of combined
bidder/target value. Using PSM, the average improvement is 14.7% (9.7%). Again these
numbers are greater than the estimates of 9.0% (7.6%) using conventional combined abnor-
mal returns in the competing bid subsample.3
Using a traditional announcement period estimation method, bidders on average pay a
signiﬁcantly higher premium for the shares they purchase in the oﬀer than the improvement
in target share value under bidder control. In contrast, using both of the new methods
developed here, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the payment is on average fair.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that traditional methods lead to incorrect inferences about eco-
nomic forces in the takeover market. We ﬁnd that friendly oﬀers, equity oﬀers, and diversi-
fying oﬀers are associated with lower combined bidder-target stock returns. A conventional
interpretation would be that the gains from combination are smaller for ﬁrms involved with
3Another reason that the traditional method can understate the true value improvement is that stock
prices of acquirers may already reﬂect an expectation that acquirers will undertake new projects including
mergers. For example, an acquisition may be part of a merger program and market reaction to a takeover
bid may only capture the surprise relative to expectations (Schipper and Thompson, 1983). However, our
probability scaling method demonstrates that the portion of the value improvement that investors learn
about at takeover announcement date is substantially underestimated by traditional methods.
2these types of transactions. However, our new methods indicate that these eﬀects reﬂect
diﬀerences in revelation about stand-alone value, not diﬀerences in the gains from combi-
nation.
For example, cash oﬀers on average are associated with higher bidder, target and com-
bined abnormal returns than equity or mixed-payment oﬀers. In contrast, based on the
intervention method, cash oﬀers do not create higher value improvements than mixed or
equity oﬀers. These ﬁndings indicate that the apparent superiority of cash oﬀers in creating
shareholder value is an illusory consequence of a more negative revelation eﬀect for equity
or mixed oﬀers than for cash oﬀers. This suggests that there is adverse selection in the use
of equity rather than cash as a medium of exchange in takeovers. Also, our ﬁnding does
not support the hypothesis that the use of cash reveals to investors a general propensity for
managers to waste cash on bad projects.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that the revelation bias is more favorable for hostile than for friendly
oﬀers. On average the market revises upward (downward) its stand-alone valuation of
bidders that make hostile (friendly) bids.4 This is consistent with investors interpreting
hostile bids as indicating that the bidder has strong cash ﬂow prospects as a stand-alone
entity, and interpreting friendly bids as indicating severe bidder agency problems.
Furthermore, conventional combined returns, PSM value improvements, and bidder re-
turns tend to be lower in diversifying acquisitions. The ﬁnding of lower bidder returns
indicates that the conclusions of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) continue to apply in a
dataset that includes the turn of the millennium. In sharp contrast, IM estimates of value
improvements are similar across these categories. The relative superiority of same-industry
acquisitions with PSM (which does not ﬁlter out revelation eﬀects) compared to IM (which
does) indicates that same-industry acquisitions are associated with more favorable revelation
than cross-industry acquisitions.
This ﬁnding suggests that investors perceive diversifying acquisitions as indicating poor
investment opportunities within the bidder’s own industry, or else that management is
prone to agency problems. It further suggests that it is updating about the quality of the
bidder’s investment opportunities or management, rather than about the advantages of the
combination, that leads to lower returns in diversifying transactions.
We also identify some factors that do aﬀect the gains from combination, not just rev-
elation about stand-alone value. For example, using all three approaches, acquisition of a
smaller target by a large bidder on average creates a smaller value improvement, measured as
4The phrase ‘stand-alone’ is used here to mean ‘not combined with the current target.’ It does not
preclude the possibility that the market perceives bidder value as potentially coming from combination
with a diﬀerent target.
3a fraction of combined value, than combinations of similar-sized ﬁrms. But measured relative
to the value of the target, the mean estimated improvement is larger for such transactions.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the importance of both synergies and target-speciﬁc im-
provements such as removal of bad management. Although the business press has raised
concerns about combinations of similarly-sized ﬁrms, these two results do not give any clear
indication that bidder/target parity in tender oﬀers is a bad thing.
Furthermore, bidder announcement period returns and total value improvements are
negatively related to bidder Tobin’s Q. This result is quite diﬀerent from the evidence from
earlier samples of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991), who found that
returns to bidders and targets are higher when high Q bidders acquire low Q targets. Our
ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁnding of Dong et al (2003) that bidders with low book/market
ratios (which are negatively correlated with Q) tend to have more negative announcement
period returns. Target announcement period returns are negatively related to target Q,
consistent with previous literature.
In summary, the new methods oﬀered here aﬀect several conclusions about tender oﬀers.
In addition to the quantitative conclusion that tender oﬀers produce greater gains than pre-
viously estimated, out approach oﬀers conclusions that contrast with those of conventional
methods about how means of payment is related to value improvements; what oﬀer hostil-
ity indicates about bidder agency problems; whether diversifying acquisitions harm value,
or just reveal adverse information about stand-alone ﬁrm prospects; and whether bidders
pay too much. These diﬀerences highlight the importance of our new methods for drawing
qualitative as well as quantitative inferences about tender oﬀers.
The next section develops an empirical measure of value improvements. Section 3 de-
scribes the tender oﬀer data. Value improvement estimates of tender oﬀers are presented in
Section 4. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Measurement of takeover value improvement
2.1 Motivation
A large previous literature uses stock return data to estimate shareholder gains from takeovers,
usually in the form of separate estimates of bidder or target gains. Such estimates reﬂect the
gain from combination, and also depend on how this surplus is divided between bidder and
target.5 To estimate the total gains from combination, BDK-88, examined a market-value-
5Numerous studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant and large positive average abnormal returns for target shareholders.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) review this evidence; more recently, see
Schwert (1996). In contrast, abnormal returns for takeover bidders tends to average fairly close to zero.
4weighted average of abnormal returns of paired bidders and targets in successful takeovers.
They examined an event window that extends to 5 days after the initial announcement of
the ultimately successful bid. Since there remains substantial uncertainty about ultimate
success of the bid at this point, this therefore provides an estimate of only a fraction of the
market’s assessment of the total value gains from takeover. BDK-88 ﬁnd that the market-
value-weighted average of bidder and target abnormal returns for successful takeovers during
the period 1962-1984 is positive and stable over this period, with an average increase of 7.4%
of combined bidder/target market value. This is their estimate of magnitude of synergistic
gains from takeover.
Ideally, as recognized by BDK-88, an event window that extends from (well before) the
initial announcement through ﬁnal successful resolution should be used to capture the full
value eﬀects of takeover. Takeover contests often take as long as 3-6 months between ﬁrst
announcement and ﬁnal resolution. Such long periods introduce a great deal of noise arising
from random price movements and errors owing to misestimation of benchmark returns.
Long periods also raise issues of the correct way to compound.6 Empirically, Andrade,
Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001, p. 110) report a slightly higher average return for the [-20,
close] announcement window than using a [-1, +1] window. However, the return estimate
becomes noisy as the window extends to the resolution of the takeover bid (with an average
window length of 142 days), and this estimate cannot be reliably distinguished from zero.
A short post-announcement window minimizes such noise and benchmark error, because
a signiﬁcant security-speciﬁc news arrives on a single day, whereas (if only factor risk is
priced) the risk premium for a single day is negligible. However, a short window estimates
only a fraction of the full value eﬀect of a successful transaction.7 This is the truncation
dilemma.
Several authors have emphasized a second problem for estimating the value eﬀects of
takeovers (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Roll, 1986; Jovanovic
and Braguinsky, 2002). This is that the announcement of an oﬀer and its form reveals bidder
information not just about the gain from combination, but about the bidder’s stand-alone
6The market model is biased to the extent that bids occur after the bidder has experienced abnormally
good times (Franks, Harris, and Titman, 1991). Barber and Lyon (1997), and Kothari and Warner (1997)
study problems of misspeciﬁcation associated with the use of long-horizon returns, and the eﬀectiveness of
alternative benchmarks.
7A familiar problem, which is not our primary focus, is that a short pre-event window omits the eﬀects
of probability revisions associated with information leaking out prior to the oﬃcial public announcement
date. Furthermore, we estimate market perceptions of value improvements; these perceptions are sometimes
incorrect; see, e.g., the model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), tests of market misvaluation based upon post-
acquisition long-run stock returns (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Mitchell and
Staﬀord, 2000; Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord, 2001; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2003a, 2003b) and
through contemporaneous measures (Dong et al, 2003).
5value. As a result, takeover-related returns do not provide a pure measure of the gain to
shareholders from takeover.
For example, the occurrence of a bid may convey the good news that a bidder ex-
pects to have high cash ﬂows, the bad news that the bidder has poor internal investment
opportunities8, or the bad news that the bidder’s management has empire-building propen-
sities. Similarly, the premium oﬀered can convey good or bad news about the bidder’s
stand-alone prospects. Also, the ‘lemons problem’ with equity issuance implies that the use
of equity as a means of payment will convey bad news about the bidder’s assets in place, and
that the use of cash will convey good news.9 In contrast, free cash ﬂow/agency problems
suggest that the announcement of a cash bid may reveal that the ﬁrm has excess cash ﬂow
relative to proﬁtable internal investment needs and that management is likely to waste that
cash on poor investments.
It follows that the market-value-weighted average of bidder and target equity returns
provides a biased estimate of the long-run total equityholder gain from takeover. We term
the error in these estimates arising from managers’ information about stand-alone value the
revelation bias.10;11
This paper describes empirically abnormal stock returns associated with announcement
of tender oﬀers in a sample that extends to the turn of the millenium,12 and oﬀers new
8See, e.g., Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002); the WSJ, 12/18/98, p. C1, Heard on the Street describes
the viewpoint of analysts that “Executives who see slowing growth often look outside their companies for
acquisition opportunities.”
9See Myers and Majluf (1984), Hansen (1987), Fishman (1989), and Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel,
(1990); and the evidence of Travlos (1987) and Franks, Harris and Titman (1991).
10Revelation eﬀects should be distinguished from signalling, the special case in which the bidder modiﬁes
his acquisition decision for the purpose of inﬂuencing short-term market perceptions. In general bidder
actions will convey information to the market, regardless of whether the bidder seeks to alter market
beliefs. Our approach can accommodate, but does not require, that signalling motives be an important
consideration in the decision of whether to make an acquisition. Even if signalling motives are not relevant,
the decision to make an oﬀer will in general reveal information possessed by the bidder, in the ways discussed
in the above paragraph.
11An alternative to stock market evidence is to examine accounting or other performance measures follow-
ing completed transactions. Several studies have drawn very diﬀerent conclusions about whether takeovers
on average increase or decrease combined fundamental value (e.g., Mueller, 1985; Healy, Palepu, and Ruback,
1992; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990.) Although such studies are quite
informative, they usually do not quantify the total discounted value eﬀect of takeovers. More importantly,
these studies are potentially subject to problems of noise, benchmark error, and revelation bias analogous
to those of stock market-based studies. For example, in regard to revelation bias, an oﬀer may be associated
with future accounting improvements which would have occurred even without a takeover.
12Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003a, 2003b) have de-
scribed several aspects of the returns to takeovers including recent years. Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord
(2001) draw a similar overall conclusion to ours, that takeovers have on average been perceived as value
increasing. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003a, 2003b) also ﬁnd positive mean returns, but emphasize
the negative dollar returns of large bidders during the 1998-2001 period.
6methods of estimating value improvements from takeover which address the truncation
dilemma and the revelation bias in stock market studies. By controlling for these biases, our
new methods imply much larger value eﬀects than traditional techniques suggest, and imply
diﬀerent conclusions about the sources of takeover value improvements. These methods may
be useful in other contexts as well for estimating the full value eﬀects of corporate events,
and for disentangling revelation eﬀects from value eﬀects of discretionary corporate actions.
Both new approaches address the truncation dilemma. Suppose, for example, that the
event window is truncated 5 days after announcement. Then the market price at the end-
point still reﬂects substantial uncertainty on the part of investors about ultimate success of
the oﬀer or of any followup oﬀer. The problem the ﬁnancial economist faces is to infer the
total value improvement eﬀect from this fragment of it, much as an anthropologist infers
the height of a hominid based on a fossilized leg bone.
The probability scaling method (PSM) adjusts returns for the possibility that the trans-
action is not completed. Ex post data is used to estimate the probability, given that a bid
has taken place, that the bidder ultimately succeeds in acquiring the target; and the proba-
bility that some other bidder ultimately takes over the target. Based on these probabilities,
the announcement period returns of bidder and target are magniﬁed to measure the total
perceived value eﬀect of a completed transaction.
The intervention method addresses both the revelation bias and the truncation dilemma,
by focusing on the returns at the time of a diﬀerent event, the arrival of a competing bid.
Because the arrival of a second bidder has a large eﬀect on the probability of the initial
bidder’s success, the abnormal return observed for the initial bidder at this event implicitly
reﬂects the size of the potential takeover value improvement.13 Furthermore, this event
does not occur at the discretion of the initial bidder; it is an external intervention. This
is crucial, because as such the arrival of a competing bid reveals little or nothing about
the stand-alone value of the initial bidder. The intervention method calculates the value
improvement implicit in the observed initial bidder return when a competing bid intervenes.
There are two key inputs to this calculation. The ﬁrst is the amount by which the
arrival of a competing bid reduces the probability that the ﬁrst bidder succeeds in acquiring
the target. The second input is the amount that the arrival of a competing bid increases
the expected price that the ﬁrst bidder will pay should it win the contest.14 Each of these
quantities can be estimated from ex post data. Holding constant these parameters, the
13The term “value improvement” in this paper refers to joint bidder and target shareholder gains. Owing
to possible wealth redistributions among other stakeholders such as employees and customers, this need not
coincide with value to society as a whole.
14A third relevant input, the initial shareholding of the ﬁrst bidder in the target, turns out to be relatively
unimportant.
7abnormal return at the time of arrival of a competing bid is a decreasing function of the
size of the takeover improvement—it is worse to lose a big improvement than a small one.
Inverting this relationship, the size of the takeover improvement can be inferred from the
observed abnormal return. A numerical illustration is provided in Appendix A.
Intuitively, the challenge for estimating value improvements is that two very diﬀerent
possibilities are consistent with a negative move in the ﬁrst bidder’s stock price upon the
arrival of a competing bid. First, the acquisition may increase the ﬁrst bidder’s value, and
arrival of the second bid conveys the bad news that this value is less likely to be realized
by the ﬁrst bidder. Second, the acquisition may decrease the ﬁrst bidder’s value, but the
arrival of the second bidder conveys the bad news that the ﬁrst bidder will on average pay
a higher premium in the event that he succeeds. To disentangle these eﬀects, we model the
relation between these parameters and stock prices.
The methods that we use require some simplifying assumptions. Conventional methods
make even stronger assumptions, though these assumptions are not explicit. For example,
to interpret returns as value improvements using conventional weighted average event-date
returns implicitly assumes that a short window can capture the whole value eﬀect, and that
there is no revelation bias. In this respect our approach has an important virtue relative
to the conventional approach: it makes assumptions explcit. Doing so allows us to quantify
explicitly the robustness of the conclusions to relaxing diﬀerent simplifying assumptions.
Intervention method estimates depend on how competition aﬀects the likelihood of oﬀer
success and bid premia. Several previous papers examine related issues. Betton and Eckbo
(2000) estimate outcome probabilities in multiple bid tender oﬀers as a function of oﬀer
premium, toehold, and the method of payment. An extensive theoretical literature considers
the role of competing bidders in takeovers (Fishman 1988, 1989; Eckbo, Giammarino and
Heinkel 1990; Ravid, and Spiegel 1999; and Bulow, Huang and Klemperer 1999).
Also, some previous papers have examined stock price reactions to events that interfere
with takeover completion. These have focused either on testing for collusion and the eﬀects
of antitrust enforcement, or documenting the abnormal returns associated with the inter-
fering event. Eckbo (1983) ﬁnds negative abnormal stock returns in merger bidders and
targets on the announcement of an antitrust complaint. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983)
ﬁnd a negative stock price reaction for a bidder upon announcement of a competing bid.
Eckbo (1992) analyzes cross-sectional determinants of the market response to government
anti-trust challenges of merger bids. He does not ﬁnd that such policies deter collusive
takeovers. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) ﬁnd that targets receive a greater share of the
value gains since the enactment of federal and state takeover legislation, and that oﬀers
with competing bids are associated with a more negative bidder abnormal return. Hietala,
8Kaplan and Robinson (2002) estimate takeover gains in a case study of competition in the
1994 acquisition of Paramount by Viacom. In contrast with these papers, our focus here
in developing the intervention method is on extracting the size of value improvements from
stock price reactions in a large sample of tender oﬀers.
2.2 Hypotheses
The primary issue to be examined is whether takeovers on average increase the joint value
of the bidder and target ﬁrms. According to Roll’s (1986) Hubris Hypothesis, there is no
value improvement from takeover; takeovers occur because of positive valuation errors by
bidding managers. Agency problems can also lead bidding managers to pay more for targets
than they are worth (e.g., “empire-building,” and misuse of free cash). We therefore call the
hypothesis of zero value improvement the Strong Agency/Hubris Hypothesis. If the Strong
Agency/Hubris Hypothesis obtains, the expected value of the target to the bidder is the pre-
takeover market price of the target. If bidding costs are neglected, then the bidder makes
negative proﬁts equal in magnitude to the total premium paid for the purchased shares.
Since tender oﬀers are frequently for less than 100% of outstanding shares, estimated
bidder proﬁts will depend on the assumptions made about the price paid for remaining shares
given that control is obtained. For two reasons, the most natural assumption is that the
same price is paid for holdouts as for the shares purchased in the tender oﬀer.15 First, fair-
price antitakeover amendments require paying at least this much to minority shareholders.
Second, even if a successful bidder is able to expropriate minority shareholders, such dilution
opportunities should be fully reﬂected in the initial bid price, so that holdout shareholders
on average receive the same price as tendering shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980).
Let ® refer to the fraction of the target’s shares owned by the ﬁrst bidder prior to the bid.
Let V T
0 be the nontakeover value of the target. Let V C be the combined post-takeover value
of the ﬁrst bidder and the target if the ﬁrst bidder succeeds in acquiring the target, where
this value is inclusive of any non-equity payments to shareholders as a result of the oﬀer.
Let the non-takeover value of the bidder be denoted V B








0 (1 ¡ ®): (1)
The ﬁrst term on the RHS is the total discounted value of cash ﬂows going to bidder and
target shareholders if the combination occurs. The last two terms subtract the total value
15Comment and Jarrell (1987) present evidence consistent with this assumption. More recently, it is not
unusual for holdout investors to receive a package of securities with face value equal to the cash oﬀer to
initially-tendering investors.
9if there is no takeover. This is the sum of the values of the bidder and the target less the
value of the bidder’s stake in the target (which would otherwise be double-counted).
Letting a bar denote an expected value, the Strong/Agency Hubris Hypothesis asserts
that the average value improvement is zero, i.e.,
¯ V
I(µ) = 0;
where µ is the market’s information set.
Some theoretical models predict that in the absence of dilution of minority shareholders,
bidders will not on average proﬁt on shares purchased in the oﬀer (Grossman and Hart,
1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990). Even if a successful bidder
loses money on these shares, he may still proﬁt from the acquisition by increasing the value
of the shares accumulated prior to the oﬀer (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The prediction
that the bidder proﬁts on shares purchased in the tender oﬀer is termed the Underpayment
Hypothesis, as opposed to the Overpayment Hypothesis. The Overpayment (Underpayment)
Hypothesis implies that the bid price on average exceeds (is less than) the value of the target
shares to the bidder. Let (1¡®)B be the total amount ultimately paid (in the form of either
cash or securities) by a successful ﬁrst bidder for shares purchased in or subsequent to the
tender oﬀer. For convenient comparison, this deﬁnition scales B to be the notional price
that would be paid if the bidder began with zero toehold and proceeded to purchase 100%
of the ﬁrm. The amount paid by the bidder for the target (the ‘price’) includes the amount
of cash paid to target shareholders and the market value of any security claims upon the
combined ﬁrm given to target shareholders. The over/underpayment hypotheses can then
be expressed as






where ¯ B denotes the expected value of the amount the initial bidder pays should he succeed.
Dividing both sides by V C
0 ´ (1 ¡ ®)V T



















This condition describes whether the bid premium exceeds the value improvement, both
measured relative to the initial combined bidder and target value.
2.3 The probability scaling method of estimating value changes
Let µ0 be all public information known prior to the ﬁrst bid. Let µ1 be all public information
known just after the ﬁrst bid. Let µ2 refer to information known just prior to the arrival of a
10competing bid. Let µ3 contain in addition the information conveyed by the competing bid.
Let dates t = 0;1;2;3 refer to dates at which µ = µ0;µ1;µ2 and µ3 respectively. Subscripts
of 0, 1, 2, and 3 will denote expectations formed conditional on these information sets.
Let ¯ V I be the post-takeover improvement in combined value, as described in 1, condi-
tional on the ﬁrst bidder succeeding. Let Át denote the probability of success of the ﬁrst
bidder in acquiring the target given µt (Á0 is the probability of a ﬁrst bidder appearing
and succeeding). Let ¯ Bt be the expected price paid by the ﬁrst bidder should he win as
assessed at date t, let ÁL
t be the probability that a ﬁrst bid occurs and a later bidder (LB)
subsequently wins, let ¯ BL
t be the expected price paid by such a winning bidder as foreseen
at date t. A 1 subscript to variables indicate expected values formed after the arrival of the
initial bid.
The conventional approach to estimating value improvements reﬂects the probabilities
of acquisition by current or later bidders, Á0 and ÁL
0, but does not estimate the probabilities.
To provide meaning to this, some interpretation is needed. One possible interpretation that
allows the conventional approach to be viewed as a value improvement is that the potential
value improvements that would be brought about by the two potential bidders are equal,
and that the probability that acquisition will be consummated by one or the other bidder
is 1. The latter assumption is strong, and clearly counterfactual. In the Probability Scaling
Method, we will relax this assumption.
Let z be the sum of the stand-alone values of the ﬁrst bidder and the target. As is
implicit in the conventional approach, we assume that the average size of the improvement
brought about by combination of a target with either the initial bidder or a later one is
equal. Then the combined value of the ﬁrst bidder and the target at date 0 is
V
C
0 = z + Á
0¯ V
I; (3)
where Á0 ´ Á0+ÁL
0 is the market’s assessment of the probability that the target is acquired
by a potential bidder in the future. For simplicity, in this analysis we consider date 0 to be
far enough in advance of the initial bid announcement that there is little market anticipation
of the oﬀer. Thus, the ex ante probabilities that a bidder appears and wins, Á0 and ÁL
0 are
close to zero. This implies that the prior expected target payoﬀ is just the stand-alone value
V T
0 , and the prior expected bidder payoﬀ is just the stand-alone value V B
0 .16
After the arrival of the initial bid, the market assigns a value Á1 +ÁL
1 to the probability
that the target is acquired by a bidder. Therefore, the combined value of the ﬁrst bidder
16As documented by Palepu (1986), takeovers are low probability events that are very hard to predict
far in advance. More generally, the approach can be modiﬁed to allow for partial anticipation of oﬀers, but
given Palepu’s evidence it is unlikely that doing so would aﬀect the results substantially.
11and the target becomes
V
C






























This formula provides a very simple implementation of the probability scaling method.
We refer to the value improvement on the left hand side estimated from this PSM formula
as the Probability Adjusted Improvement Ratio, or IRPSM.
2.4 The intervention method of estimating value changes
We now describe the intervention method for estimating value improvements. The inter-
vention method addresses the revelation bias as well as the truncation dilemma. However,
it is based on a smaller subsample of returns (the competing bid subsample). The ﬁrst step
is to calculate the bidder’s abnormal return between dates 1 and 3 in terms of the mar-
ket’s expectation of the value improvement ¯ V I(µt) at these dates.17 Then (using empirical
estimates of unconditional and conditional probabilities of success and expected premia,
abnormal returns and other parameters) we invert the relationship to infer ¯ V I(µt).
Consider the arrival of the competing bid at date 3. Let the market’s assessment of the
component of bidder’s value not derived from the takeover be y. y may not equal the pre-
oﬀer value of the bidder as assessed by the market if the initial oﬀer conveyed information
about the bidder. We assume that the arrival of a competing bid is uninformative about
the stand-alone value of the ﬁrst bidder, so that y is the same at dates 1, 2 and 3 (before
and after the arrival of the competing bid). Let R3 ´ (P3 ¡ P1)=P1 be the date 3 return
associated with information µ3, where P1 is the bidder’s stock price just after the initial bid,
and P3 is the price based on µ3 after a competing bid arrives. So
P3 = P1(1 + R3): (7)
Let ¯ V I(µ1); ¯ V I(µ3); ¯ B(µ1) and ¯ B(µ3) be abbreviated as ¯ V I
1 ; ¯ V I
3 ; ¯ B1 and ¯ B3 respectively. To
relate ¯ V (µ) to the observables P3 and P1, note that
P1 = y + ¯ ¼1
17For expositional simplicity, the model examines raw returns. For standard reasons, in implementing
the model empirically abnormal returns are used.
12P3 = y + ¯ ¼3; (8)
where ¯ ¼t is the bidder’s expected proﬁt from takeover conditional on information µt,








0 ¡ ¯ B1)
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0 ¡ ¯ B3)
i
: (9)
We assume that the arrival of the competing bid at date 3 does not provide any infor-
mation about the value improvement that the ﬁrst bidder can eﬀect through takeover.18
Hence, ¯ V I
3 = ¯ V I
1 = ¯ V I. The robustness of the results with respect to this assumption is
analyzed in Section 4.5.19 The unobservable y can be eliminated from (8), and the result
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0 +
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We call the quantity on the left hand side of (11) the Intervention Method Improvement
Ratio, or IRIM. It is the market’s estimate of the percentage improvement in the combined
value of the bidder and target. In principle, every parameter in (11) can be given an
i superscript to denote the i’th takeover contest. However, we begin by developing the
method in its most basic form by estimating certain parameters as sample means under the
assumption that they are the same across contests. Under this approach, the terms ¯ B1=V T
0
and ¯ B3=V T

























18This would obtain under the Strong Agency/Hubris Hypotheses. More generally, the arrival of either an
initial bid or competing bid could reveal information about target value. However, the evidence regarding
the information conveyed by an initial bid is mixed. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) ﬁnd that average
cumulative abnormal returns of targets are approximately zero among targets of failed oﬀers that are not
later acquired. This suggests that there may be no permanent informational revaluation associated with
the initial bid.
19This assumption is consistent with private information possessed by the second bidder. This could be
information about a private component of its valuation of the target (e.g., a synergy unique to the second
bidder). The second bidder can also possess information superior to that of investors about common value
components (e.g., gains from remedying target management failure), so long as investors do not perceive
the second bidder’s information as adding to that of the ﬁrst bidder.
13where n1 is the number of initial oﬀers, and n3 the number of contests in which a competing
bid occurs. Similarly, Á1 and Á3 can be estimated as the fraction of initial bids that succeed
in the overall sample, and in the subsample in which a competing bid occurs, respectively.
A more sophisticated approach is to estimate separate transaction-speciﬁc expected bid
premia, by regression analysis; and probabilities of success using the logit model of Table
3; see Section 4.2.
The model provides intuitively reasonable comparative statics. For example, assuming
that the competing bid causes a drop in probability of success (Á3 < Á1), a more negative
stock return on announcement of a competing bid indicates a larger value improvement. If
the arrival of a competing bid implies that a much higher bid is needed to succeed, then for
a given stock price reaction to the bid, the value improvement is smaller.
The quantities R3;P1=V C
0 , and ® can be calculated directly and are speciﬁc to the
takeover contest, to derive the value improvement ratio IRIM. The intervention method
makes no assumption whatsoever as to whether improvements are speciﬁc to changes in the
bidder, the target, or involve joint synergies.
The Strong Agency/Hubris Hypothesis implies that this ratio is zero. The Overpayment
and Underpayment Hypotheses are tested simply by comparing the average bid premium
with the average estimated improvement given in (2).
The conventional approach is based on a variety of strong assumptions. For example,
the conventional approach assumes that combined bidder/target returns reﬂect only the
gains from the speciﬁc transaction, rather than the possibility of other acquisitions should
the given transaction fall through. The conventional approach also assumes that revelation
eﬀects of the initial bid are zero. Furthermore, a conventional short-window return approach
in eﬀect implicitly assumes that, immediately after the initial oﬀer, investors believe the oﬀer
will succeed with certainty.
Our implementation of the intervention method also makes several simplifying assump-
tions. Where we diﬀer from the conventional approach is in making the relevant assumptions
explicit. Doing so has the virtue of allowing assumptions to be evaluated critically, and sug-
gesting how to test for robustness of the speciﬁcation. The assumptions we apply are that
the arrival of a competing bid does not cause investors to modify their assessment of the
stand-alone value of the ﬁrst bidder; that success of the initial bid is unrelated to the size
of the value improvement; that a bidder whose oﬀer fails is not able to locate and purchase
another similar target at the same price; and that the unsuccessful initial bidder does not
sell its toehold to a later bidder. Section 4.5 discusses and provides four modiﬁed versions of
the model to evaluate quantitatively the eﬀects of relaxing diﬀerent assumptions. In brief,
we ﬁnd that the conclusion that the conclusion that value improvements are on average
14positive is highly robust.
3 Data
While the conventional method and the new methods developed here all apply to mergers as
well as tender oﬀers, in this paper we focus our empirical tests on a comprehensive sample
of tender oﬀers during 1962-2001. Our focus on tender oﬀers is in the tradition of a large
literature (e.g., Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Lang, Stulz
and Walkling, 1989; Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988).
The initial tender oﬀer data set was constructed from two sources. The ﬁrst consists of
559 tender oﬀers that were announced during the period October 1958 through December
1984. “It contains almost every tender oﬀer made in the 1958-1984 period where at least
one ﬁrm (the target or a bidder) was listed on the NYSE or AMEX...at some time between
July 1962 and December 1984.”20 This study investigates the wealth eﬀects of a tender oﬀer
on both bidders and targets. We therefore restricted the sample to the 327 tender oﬀers
in which the bidder and target were both listed on the NYSE or AMEX. Additional data-
availability and data-consistency requirements reduced the sample size within the 1962-1984
sub-period to 292.21
The second data source consists of all tender oﬀers from 1985 through 2001, obtained
from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database. There were
778 tender oﬀers with both the target and the acquirer publicly traded on the NYSE, AMEX
or NASDAQ. After excluding 33 oﬀers, the resulting number of tender oﬀers from 1985 to
2001 in our dataset is 726.22
To compile a history of the events that occur subsequent to a tender oﬀer that might
aﬀect the probability of success of the bid, we manually searched the Wall Street Journal
Index for the 292 target ﬁrms during 1962-1984, and used the online service Dow Jones
Interactive to search the WSJ for information on the 726 target ﬁrms during 1985-2001,
for a total of 1018. For these 1018 tender oﬀers, we searched for the following informa-
20The quotation is from the write-up for the dataset compiled by Michael Bradley, Robert Comment,
Anand Desai, Peter Dodd, and Richard Ruback. We thank these authors for providing us with their data.
2112 tender oﬀers were announced prior to July 1962. The Daily CRSP tape does not contain returns
prior to this date. Our veriﬁcation of tender oﬀer announcements and name changes led to some minor
changes in the database.
22In 8 tender oﬀers, the acquirer made a subsequent tender oﬀer for the target and in these cases only the
initial tender oﬀers were included. We also excluded 11 tender oﬀers where the bidder announced multiple
takeovers at the same time. For both target and acquirer the SDC ﬁrm names and CUSIP numbers were
manually matched with ﬁrms in the CRSP database. For 33 of the tender oﬀers, CRSP data were not
available either due to the required time period (e.g. a ﬁrm was delisted prior to the tender oﬀer event) or
due to failure to match the ﬁrm reported by SDC with a ﬁrm in the CRSP database.
15tion: litigation by the target ﬁrm or its shareholders; litigation by the bidding ﬁrm or its
shareholders; a second bidder.
Table 1 records the frequency of the 1018 attempted tender oﬀers during 1962-2001; see
also Fig. 1. Using the criterion of success considered by BDK-83— that the bidder acquires
at least 15% of target shares in the tender oﬀer— 690 or 68% of these oﬀers were successful.
221 of these 1018 oﬀers were considered hostile by the target management. A second bidder
entered the contest in 147 of these 1018 tender oﬀers. Target management litigated in 232
cases. Finally, 731 of these 1018 oﬀers were all-cash oﬀers.
Fig. 2 describes the percentage of successful and unsuccessful oﬀers, the percentage
of oﬀers that had at least two bidders, the percentage oﬀers considered hostile by target
management, and the percentage of all cash oﬀers during diﬀerent periods.
Returns to bidders and targets
Table 2 summarizes the returns to bidder and target shareholders (where both companies
were listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ) during 1962-2001. Let the target and bidder
returns be denoted RT and RB respectively, and let
! ´





Then CIBR, the combined initial bid return, is a weighted average of bidder and target
abnormal returns,
CIBR = !R
T + (1 ¡ !)R
B:
This is based on a conventional short-post-announcement-window returns (day -5 to +5).
We deﬁne the dollar return for the target as its market value six days before the ﬁrst bid
multiplied by the target CAR; similarly for the bidder and combined dollar returns.
During this 40-year period, the average return to bidding shareholders has been a statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant 0.18%.23 The bidder median dollar return is an economically insigniﬁcant
-$1.2 million. During this same 40-year period, target shareholders enjoyed a statistically
and economically signiﬁcant average return of 30.0% and median dollar return of $41.2
million.
We describe returns to targets and bidders over various sub-periods in Table 2 and
Figures 3-4. The ﬁrst three sub-periods are as in BDK-88; July 1962 through June 1968 is
the pre-Williams Act period, July 1968 through December 1980 is the post-Williams Act
23Statistical signiﬁcance is measured using (a) the parametric Z-test as described by Dodd and Warner
(1983), and (b) the non-parametric Fisher sign test.
16but pre-Reagan period. 1981-1984 was the ﬁnal period considered by BDK-88. The four-
year sub-periods 1985-1988, 1989-1992, and 1993-1996 correspond roughly to presidential
political cycles. Also, the 1981-1988 period was a highly active takeover market, aided
perhaps by pro-merger policies of the Reagan administration. Some commentators have
argued that the late-80s and early-90s, corresponding to our 1989-92 sub-period, were a
time when deals were not economically attractive, but were being done for the sake of
“doing the deal.” The NASDAQ and several other broad stock indexes peaked in March
2000, and many observers regard this period as close to the peak of the new economy stock
bubble and a turning point of U.S. ﬁnancial markets. We therefore divide the most recent
portion of our sample periods between January 1997-March 2000, and April 2000-December
2001 subperiods.
Our results for bidder returns, target returns, and a value-weighted average for bidders
and targets (the “combined” return), for the ﬁrst three sub-periods (July 1962 - June 1968,
July 1968 - December 1980, 1981-1984) are consistent with the ﬁndings of Bradley, Desai
and Kim (1988). Table 2 indicates that during 1985-1988, the bidding shareholders earn
a statistically insigniﬁcant mean return of -.49% (median return of -$2.9 million). During
this same 1985-1988 period, the target shareholders received a statistically and economically
signiﬁcant return of 25.61% (median return of $37.3 million).
As suggested earlier, the late-80s and early-90s (1989-1992) were not kind to bidders:
mean return of -1.78% (median dollar return of -$8.1 million). Bidding shareholders gener-
ally fared better in the 1993-1996 sub-period: mean return of .98% (median dollar return
of $4.0 million). The mean combined returns during 1993-1996 was 5.05% (median dollar
return of $55.5 million). In the most recent sub-periods, bidders suﬀered wealth losses,
although targets realized gains. The mean combined dollar returns were negative in the
two post-1997 sub-periods (-$248.6 million and -$25.3 million, respectively), apparently due
to big losses among bidders that were relatively large (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz,
2003a, 2003b ﬁnd even larger losses to large bidders in their mergers and tender oﬀers sam-
ple during 1998-2001. They have relatively few tender oﬀers in their large loss sample). The
1997-2000 mean dollar losses in our tender oﬀer sample are of the same order of magnitude
as the dollar gains in the 1993-96 period.
174 Estimates of value improvements
4.1 Parameter inputs for the probability scaling and intervention
methods
Probability of ﬁrst bidder success
To use the probability scaling method, we need to estimate the probability that the ﬁrst
bidder is successful. Furthermore, since one of our objectives is to address the revelation
bias, we need to identify an intervention that changes the probability that the ﬁrst bidder
succeeds, and which is not at the discretion of the ﬁrst bidder. Litigation by the target, entry
of a second bidder, and objection by a regulatory agency are examples of such exogenous
events. Our focus is on the arrival of a competing bid, which is a major event for the initial
bidder.
To estimate how the market’s perception of probability of success is aﬀected by the
arrival of a competing bid, we need estimates of the market’s perception of probability of
success both prior to the competing bid (an ‘unconditional’ estimate), and subsequent to
the bid (a ‘conditional’ estimate). We therefore estimate both a logit model that conditions
only on information known to the market prior to the arrival of the competing bid, and a
logit model which in addition conditions on the arrival of the bid.
Table 3 provides estimates of such models. The dependent variable equals one if the ﬁrst
bidder is successful and zero otherwise. Litigation = 1 if the target ﬁles a lawsuit against
the ﬁrst bidder and zero otherwise. Competing bid = 1 if a second bidder enters the bidding
contest and zero otherwise. Hostile = 1 if target management verbally opposes the ﬁrst bid,
and zero otherwise. ® is the fraction of the target’s shares held by the ﬁrst bidder at the
date of the initial oﬀer. Eﬀective premium is the premium oﬀered by the ﬁrst bidder using
the target’s price six days prior to the bid as the baseline, multiplied by the percentage of
target shares sought by the bidder. Relative size is the bidder/target market value ratio.24
Model A does not condition on whether a competing bid has occurred; model B does. In
measuring bidder returns we consider both a shorter and a longer window. The short window
consists of the period one day before and the day of the ﬁrst competing bid announcement
for the target. The long window consists of the period one day after the ﬁrst bid to the day
of the ﬁrst competing bid announcement for the target. For the short window, the market
is likely by this time to have learned about the occurrence of litigation related to the initial
bid if such litigation was going to occur. At the start of the longer window that begins
24Walkling (1985) and Schwert (2000) ﬁnd some of the variables used here to be signiﬁcant determinants
of tender oﬀer success.
18immediately after the arrival of the initial bid, the market is unlikely to have observed the
occurrence of litigation even if it later occurs. Thus, for the short window Model A1 is
appropriate, and for the longer window Model A2 is appropriate.
The results indicate that target management opposition, entry of a second bidder and the
eﬀective premium are determinants of bidder success (opposition and competition having
negative eﬀects), and, with somewhat lower signiﬁcance, target litigation and relative size.25
Thus, the arrival of a competing bid does indeed have an important eﬀect on oﬀer success.
Parameter inputs for the probability scaling method
Estimating the probability scaling method improvement ratio IRPSM requires that re-
turns be grossed up by the sum of the probabilities that the ﬁrst bidder succeeds and that
a later bid succeeds. This requires the following inputs:
² Á1 is the probability of success of the ﬁrst bidder. In the full sample of 1018 cases the
ﬁrst bidder is successful in 690 instances. For both PSM and IM, we apply transaction-
speciﬁc estimates using Logit model A2 in Table 3. Á1 can also be estimated globally
as .6778 using a simple sample average.
² ÁL
1 is the probability that a later bid succeeds in acquiring the target. We derive an
estimate of this probability from Betton and Eckbo (2000) to be .1463.
Parameter inputs for the intervention method
The intervention method value improvement ratio IRIM is estimated based on equation
(11). We consider bidder abnormal returns around the announcement of a competing bid.
The abnormal returns are computed using the market model as the benchmark.26 During
a two-day period consisting of the day of the publication of the news of the second bid
in the WSJ and the day before, the mean abnormal return for the ﬁrst bidder is -.44%,
(median/min/max are -.42%/-11.71%/12.57%). The mean return for the period from one
day after the publication of the news of the ﬁrst bid in the WSJ to the day of the publication
of the news of the second bid is -3.58% (median/min/max are -1.96%/-99.81%/40.31%).
The two-day mean average abnormal return on the date of arrival of a competing bid is
close to zero. But as we have documented, the arrival of a competing bidder has powerful
25Target opposition is a matter of degree, see Schwert (2000); whereas the arrival of a competing oﬀer is
a discrete event. Thus, the latter seems a more appropriate subject for the intervention method.
26For the short return cumulation window used here, the choice of benchmark is unlikely to aﬀect results
materially; see Brown and Warner (1985). The market model is estimated using returns from day -170
through day -21 where day 0 is the announcement of the ﬁrst bid in the WSJ. The equally weighted CRSP
index is used as the market index.
19eﬀects on mean premia and on success probabilities. The event-date return reﬂects two
oﬀsetting eﬀects. The higher average premium a winning ﬁrst bidder will have to pay
given a competing bid is bad news, but the reduced probability of success resulting from
a competing bid can be good news if the market expects a successful bidder to overpay.
Since the intervention method disentangles these possibilities, a zero return (for example)
can map into substantial value improvements.
If the market is eﬃcient, and if no news about a competing bid arrives until the day
that the bid occurs, then the abnormal return expected from date 1 (immediately after the
initial bid) through date 2 (just before the competing bid) will on average be zero. Thus,
equation (11), which gives IRIM in terms of R3, the return from date 1 through date 3,
also applies with a return from date 2 through date 3, or by choosing some starting date
between date 1 and date 2.
There is a tradeoﬀ in using diﬀerent periods. If news about a competing bid sometimes
arrives between date 1 and 2, calculating the return based on the earlier starting point has
the advantage of including the eﬀects of such anticipation of the event. However, calculating
the abnormal return over a longer period has the disadvantage of introducing noise arising
from normal stock price ﬂuctuations and from benchmark estimation errors.
We therefore estimate the return to be substituted for R3 in (11) based on the two
diﬀerent periods discussed earlier: the two-day event period (mean -.43%) and the period
from immediately after announcement of the initial bid through announcement of the second
bid (mean -3.58%). We require the following further inputs (all transaction-speciﬁc except
as otherwise indicated):
² P1=V C
0 in equation (11) is the size of the bidder relative to initial combined value.
The mean (median) ﬁgure is .656 (.690).
² V T
0 =V C
0 in equation (11) is the size of the target relative to combined value prior to
the initial oﬀer. The mean (median) ﬁgure is .368 (.327).
² Á1 is the probability of success of the ﬁrst bidder. In our sample the ﬁrst bidder is
successful in 690 out of 1018 contests. Hence Á1 is estimated as 690/1018= .6778;
we also use alternative transaction-speciﬁc estimates using Logit model A1 or A2 in
Table 3.
² Á3 is the probability of success of the ﬁrst bidder given the arrival of a competing
bidder. In our sample, there are 147 cases in which a competing bidder arrives; the
ﬁrst bidder is successful in 38 instances. Hence Á3 is estimated as 38/147 = .2585; we
also use alternative transaction-speciﬁc estimates using Logit model B in Table 3.
20² ® is the fraction of the target’s equity owned by the ﬁrst bidder. For the 141 tender
oﬀers in our competing bid subsample to which we can apply IM, the mean (median)
® is 2.41% (0%). For our whole sample of tender oﬀers, the mean bidder ownership is
6.13%, the median ownership is 0%, and only 220 of the 1018 bidders own any shares
in the target at the time they make the bid.
² ¯ B1=V T
0 is the average price (relative to the target’s pre-oﬀer price) at which the ﬁrst
bidder wins in the full sample, and we also use alternative transaction-speciﬁc esti-
mates using a regression technique. The estimate based on sample mean is 1.407.
² ¯ B3=V T
0 is the average price at which the ﬁrst bidder wins given the arrival of a compet-
ing bidder, and we also use alternative transaction-speciﬁc estimates using a regression
technique. The estimate based on sample mean is 1.514.
4.2 Estimated value improvements
In the competing bid subsample, we use several alternative methods to estimate input
parameters for IM. The calculations apply equation (11) using estimated parameters Á1,
Á3, ¯ B1=V T
0 , and ¯ B3=V T
0 . When these parameters are estimated using sample means as
described above (hereafter, the baseline parameter speciﬁcation), the mean (median) IRIM
is 13.1% (12.4%), indicating that the discounted combined value as assessed by the market
is 13.1% more valuable as a result of the takeover. This evidence is inconsistent with the
Strong Agency/Hubris Hypothesis of zero value improvements in tender oﬀers. Since the
distribution of IRIM is not especially skewed, and 132 of 141 IRIMs are greater than zero,
the conclusion that the expected value improvement is signiﬁcantly greater than zero is
highly robust (p < :001 by a sign test). A histogram of IRIM is provided in Fig. 5.
We also estimate separate transaction-speciﬁc probabilities of success using the logit
model of Table 3 to obtain individual probability estimates for each of the 147 transactions.
Similarly, instead of assuming that the expected bid premium that will be paid (relative to
pre-oﬀer price) in the event that the ﬁrst bidder succeeds is independent of the transaction,
we estimate regression models relating the price paid in successful transactions to the same
independent variables used in Logit Models A1, A2, and B (excluding eﬀective premium).
This generates a corresponding set of regression models.
These results (unreported) are consistent with the conclusion that value improvements
on average diﬀer from zero and are generally positive. For example, when Á1 and Á3 are
respectively estimated using Logit model A1 and A3 in Table 3, and ¯ B1=V T
0 and ¯ B3=V T
0 are
21estimated using regression models similar to model A1 and B in Table 3 (excluding eﬀective
premium), the mean (median) value improvement is 14.8% (13.8%), which is quite similar
to the estimates obtained using our baseline parameter speciﬁcation. Appendix B further
veriﬁes the robustness of this conclusion with respect to alternative estimates of the input
parameters. In what follows, we draw our numerical inference on the IM estimate using our
baseline parameter speciﬁcation.
In Table 4, market-based estimates of the expected combined value improvement from
takeover (relative to combined bidder-target value) are labeled CIBR, IRPSM and IRIM.
The average estimated CIBR associated with the arrival of an initial bid during 1962-2001
is approximately 5.27% (median of 3.69%) of combined bidder/target value.
Using PSM, the average estimated value improvement, IRPSM is larger— approximately
7.28% (median of 4.63%) of combined bidder/target value. The average diﬀerence between
the IRPSM and CIBR estimates relative to combined value is 2.02% (median of .22%), with
63.4% of the diﬀerences being positive.
We also use a proxy for the revelation bias, the diﬀerence IRPSM ¡ IRIM. IRPSM
reﬂects the change in underlying value that would be associated with takeover success, but
also includes revelation eﬀects. IRIM contains only the underlying value eﬀect, not the
revelation eﬀect. The diﬀerence is therefore a proxy for the revelation bias. According to
Table 4, the overall revelation bias is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However, there
is variation in revelation eﬀects across time, degree of hostility, and means of payment, as
discussed further in the next Section.
4.3 Determinants of value improvements and revelation eﬀects
We describe several possible determinants of value improvements, and the variables we use
as proxies for these determinants. In Tables 5, 6 and 7, we present univariate results of how
value improvements are related to these determinants. In Table 8, we present multivariate
regression results.
Friendly versus hostile oﬀers
Academics and other commentators have proposed two very diﬀerent economic roles for
takeovers—discipline/removal of bad target managers, and exploitation of business syner-
gies. Hostile oﬀers are supposed to be associated with removal of bad target managers, and
friendly oﬀers with exploitation of business synergies. To examine these issues we include
22the Hostile dummy deﬁned in Section 3 as an independent variable.
Cash versus mixed versus equity oﬀers
In general, as in Myers and Majluf (1984), issuance of equity can convey adverse infor-
mation about the ﬁrm’s existing assets in place. Several models of means of payment in
takeovers imply an adverse selection problem associated with greater use of equity. Under
an adverse selection approach, the use of cash may provide the favorable revelation that
equity was not used. On the other hand, a cash oﬀer may reveal that the ﬁrm has cash in
excess of its internal investment needs, and is likely to squander that cash on poor invest-
ments should the bid fail (Jensen, 1988; Stulz, 1990). This implies a negative revelation
eﬀect.27
Same-industry versus diversifying transactions
We deﬁne an acquisition as same-industry versus cross-industry (i.e., non-diversifying
versus diversifying) according to whether the target ﬁrm has the same or a diﬀerent SIC
code from the bidder. We consider both 3-digit and 4-digit COMPUSTAT SIC codes.
Relative market values of bidder and target
It has been argued that so-called ‘mergers of equals’ are hard to implement successfully.28
This suggests that acquisitions of small targets by large bidders will tend to generate greater
improvement per dollar spent on acquisition than combinations of similar-sized ﬁrms. It
could also be argued that in unequal acquisitions, the business beneﬁts of possessing the
target can be ‘leveraged’ across a larger set of operations, again yielding greater gains per
dollar spent on acquisition.
In the univariate analysis, we place transactions in four relative size categories: bid-
der/target market value ratio < 0:7 (small bidder), 0:7 < X < 1:5 (same relative size),
1:5 < X < 5:0 (big relative size), 5:0 < X (largest relative size). We use a continuous
variable, the logarithm of relative size, in the regressions.
Tobin’s Q
Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) found that takeover gains are
related to bidder and target Q ratios. Following Martin (1996), we deﬁne Q as the sum of
27An alternative story is that paying with cash indicates a good management that is willing to commit
itself to discipline in future investments; this would imply a favorable revelation about managerial quality.
28See, e.g., The Economist, 1/9/99, page 15: “Nor does it [success] require similarity of size: mergers of
equals seem to be especially tricky, perhaps because they disrupt two strong corporate cultures, and they
often throw up intractable problems of leadership.” (The use of the term ‘mergers’ in the quoted remark
seems to be generic, rather than exclusive of tender oﬀers.)
23market value of equity, long-term debt, short-term debt, and preferred stock divided by book
value of equity, calculated as of the ﬁscal year-end preceding the takeover announcement
date.
Time dependence of value improvements
The Williams Act of 1968 and associated legislation requiring disclosure and delaying
completion of tender oﬀers makes it easier for competitors to investigate the target after an
initial bid (Jarrell and Bradley, 1980). One would expect this to narrow the set of bidders
who are willing to make an initial oﬀer. This suggests that post-Williams transactions should
be associated with higher value improvements. Several authors have documented large
changes in premia and several other takeover-related variables beginning at approximately
this time (though explanations diﬀer as to the source of these changes). To assess the
eﬀect of the Williams Act, we create a dummy variable for pre-Williams (7/62-6/68) and
post-Williams subperiods.
In addition, commentators have claimed that the U.S. ﬁnancial market environment
has changed after March 2000, when the NASDAQ and several other broad stock indexes
peaked. We examine whether there was a shift in value gains after March 2000 by using a
dummy for pre- and post-March 2000.
Results
Panels A and B of Table 5 indicate that combined returns to bidders and targets, as
measured by CIBR and IRPSM, are on average considerably higher in hostile than in friendly
oﬀers. In the overall sample (Panel A), the mean CIBR of hostile oﬀers is 8.43%, versus
4.38% for friendly oﬀers. The mean IRPSM of hostile oﬀers is 16.34%, versus 4.75% for
friendly oﬀers. For both measures, the diﬀerence between hostile and friendly oﬀers is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. However, Table 5 indicates that hostile bidders earn lower
announcement period returns than friendly bidders.29 Target announcement period returns
in hostile oﬀers are also not higher than in friendly oﬀers. This suggests that hostile bidders
that are large (small) relative to targets earn higher (lower) announcement period returns.
The diﬀerence between friendly and hostile oﬀers is much larger for IRPSM than for CIBR
because hostile bids are less likely to succeed. In consequence, the traditional CIBR method
biases returns toward zero more for hostile bids more than for friendly bids. Thus, the
probability scaling method indicates an even greater diﬀerence between friendly and hostile
bids than what is indicated by traditional methods. Large friendly/hostile diﬀerences in
29The Hostile coeﬃcient in the bidder CAR regression in Table 8 is negative but not signiﬁcant at
conventional levels, consistent with Schwert (2000) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003a, 2003b).
24IRPSM are also present in the competing bid subsample of Panel B. The multivariate results
in Table 8 also conﬁrm that IRPSM is signiﬁcantly positively related to hostility (we do not
run regressions with IRIM as the dependent variable, owing to the small competing-bid
sample size).
In contrast with the large friendly/hostile diﬀerences in IRPSM, in Table 5, Panel B the
intervention method measure (IRIM) indicates that hostile oﬀers are not associated with
signiﬁcantly higher value improvements than friendly oﬀers. Since IM estimates ﬁlter out
revelation eﬀects, the diﬀerent behavior of the IRPSM and IRIM estimates indicates that
friendly and hostile oﬀers convey diﬀerent information to investors about bidder stand-alone
value.
Table 5 Panel B indicates that hostility is related to a larger (more positive) revelation
eﬀect IRPSM ¡ IRIM (signiﬁcant at the 1% level). There is a positive revelation eﬀect of
hostile oﬀers (6.06%, signiﬁcant at the 1% level), and a negative revelation eﬀect of friendly
oﬀers (-4.42%, signiﬁcant at the 1% level). The average upward revision in the market’s
assessment of the stand-alone value of hostile bidders is consistent with the hypothesis
that hostile bids are taken by the market as an indicator of strong cash ﬂow prospects or
organizational capabilities on the part of the bidder.30 Alternatively, the negative revelation
about friendly bidders and the positive revelation about hostile bidders may derive from
the fact that hostile oﬀers are more prone to be cash and friendly oﬀers more prone to be
equity or mixed payment. We discuss revelation eﬀects associated with means of payment
below.
Although there are diﬀerences in stockholder returns between friendly and hostile oﬀers,
the thrust of this evidence is that both hostile and friendly oﬀers are associated with sub-
stantial value improvements in takeovers. Thus, overall, this evidence indicates that both
disciplinary and synergistic roles for takeover are important.
Table 5 indicates an ordering in which cash oﬀers on average create greater CIBR and
IRPSM value improvements than mixed oﬀers, and mixed oﬀers greater than stock oﬀers;
most of the comparisons are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Similarly, in the multivariate analysis
of Table 8, in the regressions with dependent variables CIBR and IRPSM, the coeﬃcient on
cash (equity) is signiﬁcantly positive (negative).
Owing to the smaller sample sizes in Panel B, there is less power to detect diﬀerences.
Nevertheless, a pattern that emerges clearly is that the value improvement diﬀerence be-
tween equity and mixed-payment oﬀers is much smaller using the intervention method. In
30Despite the favorable revelation about stand-alone value, investors presumably understand that success-
ful hostile oﬀers can be very expensive for the bidder, so there is not presumption that the announcement
period returns for hostile oﬀers is positive; see the discussion at footnote 29.
25consequence, the revelation bias IRPSM ¡ IRIM is much more negative for stock than for
cash oﬀers (diﬀerence in means signiﬁcant at the 5% level, diﬀerence in medians signiﬁcant
at the 1% level), and more negative for stock than for mixed oﬀers (diﬀerence in means
signiﬁcant at the 10% level, diﬀerence in means signiﬁcant at the 5% level). The point
estimates also indicate a more negative revelation bias for mixed oﬀers than for cash oﬀers
(substantial for medians), though the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. In other words, greater
use of equity is associated with more negative revelation about bidder stand-alone value.
Thus, our evidence is consistent with the adverse selection theory’s implication that the use
of equity is an adverse indicator of ﬁrm value, and is not consistent with the argument that
the use of cash reveals a propensity of bidding management to waste free cash ﬂow.
A large literature debates the extent to which diversifying acquisitions are associated
with more severe bidder agency problems. The agency theory of diversiﬁcation suggests
both lower true value improvements, and certainly lower bidder returns, in cross-industry
transactions than same-industry transactions. The data provide support for the notion
that same-industry acquisitions create greater value than cross-industry acquisitions. In
Table 6, bidder returns and value improvement measures are generally lower in diversifying
acquisitions. The evidence for bidder returns extends the conclusions of Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1990) to the turn of the millennium. The ﬁnding for combined value improvements
indicates that the lower bidder returns in diversifying acquisitions do not derive solely from
redistribution to targets. The results also indicate that the greater gains to same-industry
acquisitions identiﬁed in stock mergers by Maquieira, Megginson and Nail (1998) also applies
in tender oﬀers. Similarly, in the multivariate analysis of Table 8, the coeﬃcient estimates for
the same-industry dummy are signiﬁcantly positive for most of the value measure columns.
Our ﬁndings provide an interesting contrast with those of Moeller, Schlingemann and
Stulz (2003a, 2003b), who ﬁnd diversiﬁcation to be insigniﬁcant as a predictor of bidder
announcement period returns in public acquisitions.31
Although Table 6 indicates that same-industry acquisition are generally associated with
higher bidder and combined returns than cross-industry acquisitions, Panel B indicates
that IRIM is about the same in the two groups, indicating similar value improvements from
combination. The IRPSM ¡IRIM block indicates the reason: same-industry acquisitions are
associated with more favorable revelation than cross-industry acquisitions. This suggests
that investors perceive diversifying acquisitions as indicating that management is prone to
31As discussed earlier, the sample of Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003a, 2003b) includes mergers as
well as tender oﬀers, and our study covers a longer sample period. Also, they deﬁne industry using SDC SIC
codes, whereas we deﬁne industries using Compustat SIC’s. Kahle and Walkling (1996) provide evidence
suggesting that Compustat SIC codes are better speciﬁed than CRSP SIC codes.
26agency problems such as wasteful investment, whereas same-industry acquisitions indicate
managerial discipline and expertise. These results do not indicate any great pessimism on
the part of investors about the value of combination in diversifying transactions. Rather,
they indicate that the low returns associated with these transactions derive from adverse
updating about the quality of the bidder and its management.
Table 7 shows that acquisitions in which the bidder is relatively large compared to the
target improve value (as a fraction of combined value) signiﬁcantly less. The regression
results in Table 8 conﬁrm this ﬁnding: value improvement measures are inversely related
to the relative size of the bidder versus the target. In contrast, when takeover gains are
measured relative to the value of the target (not reported here), the mean estimated im-
provement is largest when a target is acquired by a much larger bidder. Despite concerns
raised in the business press about so-called ‘mergers of equals,’ it is not clear from these
two pieces of evidence that parity of bidder and target size in a tender oﬀer is a bad thing.
Previous research on relative size has focused on its eﬀects on bidder returns. Asquith,
Bruner and Mullins (1983) found that merger bidder returns are decreasing with the relative
size of the bidder versus target. In a recent sample, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz
(2003a) report that after controlling for bidder size, relative size is unrelated to the returns
of bidders acquiring public ﬁrms. Our evidence indicates that relative size is also related to
total (combined) value improvements.
If the gains from combination are derived solely from target improvements such as re-
moval of bad management, then a larger relative size of the bidder would not increase the
gains relative to the size of the target. Thus, our ﬁnding suggests that there are gains from
combination involving synergies between bidder and target. Something about the target–
perhaps a unique technology— can be ‘leveraged’ to provide a ﬁrm-wide beneﬁt to the bid-
der. On the other hand, the fact that greater relative size of the bidder implies smaller value
gains relative to combined value suggests that there are limits to this leveraging. To some
extent the gains do seem to come from changes speciﬁc to the target rather than general
synergies.
To investigate how value improvements are related to bidder and target Tobin’s Q ratios,
we run value improvement regressions, including Q ratios in the list of independent variables,
as well as separate regressions of bidder and target returns on takeover characteristics. The
results are reported in the last four columns of Table 8. Bidder announcement period
returns (CAR) and total value improvements are negatively related to bidder Q, and target
announcement period CAR is negatively related to target Q. The eﬀect of Q in our sample
is economically signiﬁcant. In Table 8, the coeﬃcient of bidder Q is -0.38, meaning for
an increase of 1 unit of bidder Q, bidder return decreases by -0.38%. Since the standard
27deviation of Q is 3.26 (the average bidder Q is 1.88), Q is associated with non-negligible
variation in return.
Our bidder returns ﬁnding is consistent with the fact (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Brown and
Ryngaert, 1991; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz,
2003a, 2003b) that stock bidders have lower announcement period returns, since stock
bidders tend to have higher Q (Martin, 1996) and lower book/market ratios (e.g., Dong
et al, 2003).
However, this ﬁnding is quite diﬀerent from those of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989)
and Servaes (1991). In their earlier sample, bidder returns were higher when high Q bidders
acquired low Q targets. The diﬀerence in results suggests that the takeover boom of the
1990s had a diﬀerent character from that of the 1980s. Our ﬁnding also contrasts with that
of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003a, 2003b) that there is no economically signiﬁcant
relation between bidder Q and returns in acquisitions of public ﬁrms. Their sample diﬀers
from ours in several ways. It includes only successful acquisitions, includes merger bids as
well as tender oﬀers, and covers a shorter time period than our sample.
Also, Table 8 indicates that higher target Tobin’s Q is associated with lower target
announcement stock returns. This is consistent with recent ﬁndings for target book-market
ratios; see Dong et al (2003), and with earlier ﬁndings of Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989)
and Servaes (1991).
Based on Table 4, it appears that 1989-92 was a period of unusually low value improve-
ments from takeover (based on CIBR and IRPSM– the sample size for IRIM for this period
is too small to be meaningful). There is no indication that the takeover boom of the mid-
1990s was associated with high percentage value improvements. Based on our estimates,
the dollar value increase associated with the mid-1990s transactions was large. However,
transactions in the late 1990s and the post-March 2000 period were associated with large
wealth losses, due to the tremendous value losses to some relatively large bidders. These
results are broadly consistent with the ﬁndings of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003a)
(whose focus was on absolute bidder size).
In Table 5, it appears that value improvements were higher prior to than subsequent
to the Williams Act. However, based on Table 8, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the pre- and post-Williams Amendment periods under any of the two value improvement
measures. This suggests that the diﬀerence in takeover gains between these subperiods
found in Table 5 was likely due to shifts in takeover characteristics that are captured as
explanatory variables in the multivariate analysis, such as a relatively high proportion of
cash oﬀers and smaller bidders prior to the Williams Act.
Table 5 also indicates that there was a massive increase in target announcement period
28abnormal returns in the post-March 2000 period: from 28.77% to 44.78% (means), and from
25.30% to 39.81% (medians). This ﬁnding is reinforced by the target return regression in
Table 8, in which the coeﬃcient on the Post-March 2000 category variable is substantial
(11.24, t = 3:24). This indicates that the increase in target returns goes above and beyond
what would be predicted by shifts in the regression explanatory variables.
Table 5 also indicates (signiﬁcant with the PSM measure) that, after March 2000, com-
bined returns (CIBR and IRPSM) decreased. In contrast, the ﬁrst two regressions in Table
8 suggest that combined returns increased after March 2000. However, as the next two
regressions indicate, after controlling for bidder and target Tobin’s Q’s, the post-March
2000 dummy is not signiﬁcant for CIBR or IRPSM. These ﬁndings indicate that the post-
March 2000 decrease in combined returns can be explained fully by shifts in the explanatory
variables.
Do bidders pay too much?
To measure over- or under- payment, it is convenient to measure bid premia relative
to combined bidder/target value, according to the overpayment condition (2). The results
in Table 9 highlight that the new methods have an important eﬀect on inferences. If we
estimate value improvements using CIBR, the combined abnormal stock return, we ﬁnd
that in the competing bid sub-sample, bidders on average signiﬁcantly overpaid, by 5.1%
(median 3.0%), with almost 65% of the 135 observations indicating overpayment. This
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. However, as we have argued, CIBR captures only
a fraction of the total takeover gains, and is subject to revelation bias. Using either the
intervention method or the probability scaling method, the mean value improvement is not
statistically diﬀerent from the mean premium paid in these multiple bidder oﬀers. So we
cannot reliably reject the null that the payment is on average fair. In the competing bid
sub-sample, both of the new methods developed here indicate that about half of the 135
initial bidders overpaid. Since value improvements are large, it appears that most of the
bid premia can be explained by value improvements.32
32There is a possible sample selection bias in the intervention method. The intervention method examines
initial bidder returns when a competing bidder enters, but if the initial bidder oﬀers too much on his ﬁrst
bid, this will tend to discourage competitors from arriving. Thus, a bidder who oﬀers a very generous initial
oﬀer may not end up in the multiple-bidder sample. On the other hand, other things equal, the arrival of a
competitor raises the amount that a ﬁrst bidder with given valuation will have to pay. Thus, we doubt that
there is more overpayment in single-bidder contests than in multiple bidder contests. This view is consistent
with evidence on competitors’ stock returns (see BDK-88).
294.4 Robustness of IM, PSM and traditional measures to window
length
All of the methods we apply are inﬂuenced by the length of the window selected. To evaluate
whether the value improvements derived by IM and PSM are higher than those implied by
traditional approaches, it is therefore of interest to consider diﬀerent window lengths.
Using traditional methods, with a day -5 to +5 window where date 0 is the date of the
initial bid, the mean (median) weighted average of the bidder and target returns using value
weights is 5.27% (3.69%), with 71% of the returns being positive; see Table 2, Panel A. In
the older sample of BDK-88, the mean initial return relative to combined market value is
6.93%. Thus, there was a decline in mean returns in the decade following the BDK study.
A reasonable starting point that would account for pre-public-announcement anticipa-
tion of the event would be in the order of 30 to 40 days; see, e.g., Fig. 1 of Schwert (1996).
Using a longer window that begins 30 days prior to the initial oﬀer and runs through ﬁnal
announcement of the transaction, we obtain a mean (median) bidder and target weighted
return of 7.12% ( 6.35%). The corresponding measure beginning 90 days prior to the initial
oﬀer is 6.65% (7.05%).
The combined CARs for these initial returns for diﬀerent windows are summarized in
Table 2, Panel B. Even with long event windows prior to the event, the mean CAR based
on the initial bid is at most only 7.1%, as compared with 13.1% using the intervention
method.33 These results imply that the gains from takeover are considerably greater than
the (already substantial) gains estimated in previous studies.
Furthermore, the use of a (-1,0) window by IM for the arrival of the competing bid also
potentially misses some runup. In unreported results, we ﬁnd that a longer pre-competing-
bid window is associated with even higher IRIM estimate.
4.5 Robustness with respect to model speciﬁcations
1. Competing bidder information
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the arrival of a competing bid may convey information
about either the stand-alone value of the target or its value to the initial bidder– a diﬀerent
kind of revelation eﬀect. Footnotes 18 and 19 argue this is likely to have only a minor
33The use of a long window such as 60 or 90 days is probably suboptimal. While such a window ensures
that any pre-event information leakage is captured in the return, it also greatly increases noise. In this case,
as we lengthen the window the mean CAR increases up to a 30 day window. But moving from a 15 to a 30
day window leads to a smaller fraction of positive abnormal returns, suggesting that the problem of noise
starts to become severe in the longer window.
30eﬀect on IM estimation. More importantly, the intervention method mitigates this problem
relative to previous studies by focusing on competing bids, since it is likely that much of
the private information possessed by bidders about targets will already be conveyed by the
initial oﬀer.
If the arrival of a competing bid causes an upward revision in the assessed valuation of
the ﬁrst bidder, then ceteris paribus the ﬁrst bidder’s abnormal return R3 will be higher.
By constraining ¯ V3 = ¯ V1, our estimates would tend to wrongly attribute any such higher
abnormal return to the reduced probability of the initial bidder succeeding. Thus, the esti-
mated value improvement would be biased downwards, providing a conservative estimate.
Thus, the inference that takeovers are on average associated with positive underlying value
improvements is strengthened.
To analyze this issue directly, suppose that ¯ V I
3 = K ¯ V I
1 , K ¸ 1, i.e., the arrival of a
competing bid causes an upward revision in the assessed valuation by the ﬁrst bidder of
owning the target. We abbreviate ¯ V I
1 as ¯ V I in the following. Substituting into equations







































As suggested Section 2.4, K is likely to be close to one. The implied IRIM estimates, which
are increasing in K, are provided in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 10. This simulation
supports the conclusion of positive average value improvements; large values of K lead to
implausibly high values for ¯ V I=V C
0 .
2. Future acquisitions
The basic analysis assumed that success or failure of the oﬀer has no eﬀect on any future
acquisitions that the bidder may make. More generally, if the ﬁrst bidder fails to acquire the
target, there is a probability that it will thereafter successfully acquire a similar target at a
price similar to what he would have paid if he had been successful in acquiring the original
target. If so, the stock price reaction to failure of the initial bid will be muted. Of course, a
bidder whose oﬀer fails is not certain to make an additional acquisition as a consequence of
failure.34 We model this possible dependence by allowing for some probability that failure
of the oﬀer will cause the bidder to try to acquire another comparable target at the same
34There is no diﬃculty if the bidder intends to make other acquisitions regardless of the outcome of the
ﬁrst contest. The calculation of the stock price reaction associated with the arrival of a competing bid needs
modiﬁcation only if future acquisitions depend on the success or failure in the current contest.
31expected price.35 Suppose that value improvements in takeovers are positive. Then when
the arrival of a competing bid reduces the probability of success, the bidder actually has a
good chance of succeeding in another acquisition, so the actual bidder return will be greater
than that implied by the basic model of Section 4. This higher return implies that IRIM
will underestimate the actual improvement. Similarly, if value improvements are negative,
IRIM will overestimate the improvement. So long as failure may lead to another comparable
acquisition, the basic method biases IRIM toward zero, but leaves its sign unchanged.36 A
robustness check is provided by reestimating IRIM’s in a model in which, given failure, there
is a probability ° that the bidder will make another acquisition attempt of equal quality to
the ﬁrst.
Suppose that the ﬁrst bidder can ﬁnd another identical target with probability ° after
failure to acquire the ﬁrst target. Then equations (9) and (11) become
¯ ¼1 = [Á1 + °Á1(1 ¡ Á1)][®¯ V
I + (1 ¡ ®)(¯ V
I + V
T
0 ¡ ¯ B1)] (13)
¯ ¼3 = [Á3 + °Á1(1 ¡ Á3)][®¯ V
I + (1 ¡ ®)(¯ V
I + V
T







































where ±1 ´ Á1[1 + °(1 ¡ Á1)], and ±2 ´ (Á1 ¡ Á3)(°Á1 ¡ 1). IRIM decreases as a function
of °, but the eﬀect is weak. As shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 10, the estimated value
improvement is still positive and substantial for plausible values of °. The eﬀect of ° on
IRIM would be stronger if, after a second failure, the bidder again had a probability of
turning to a third target and so on.
3. Sale of shares to another bidder
We now allow for the possibility that an unsuccessful initial bidder can sometimes proﬁt
by selling his holdings to a successful competing bidder. Let Pr(S2jµ) denote the probability
35There are several possible reasons why this probability is less than one. First, alternative targets may
seem less attractive to bidding management. For example, under Roll’s hubris hypothesis, a bidder’s ﬁrst
oﬀer will be to the target he overvalues the most. Second, a manager may change his mind about the
desirability of acquisition. Third, he may retire or be replaced before he locates another target. Fourth,
if acquisition is undesirable, the initial oﬀer may rouse large shareholders or the board to oppose further
attempts.
36More generally, the sign could be incorrect, but this requires a rather special scenario. For example, if
the improvement is always zero in the initial contest, but after an initial failure the bidder always makes a
negative NPV acquisition, then the stock return will be lower than the calculation in Section 4. The negative
stock return, in combination with the reduction in probability of success associated with the arrival of a
competing bid, would tend to be attributed to a positive value improvement.
32of arrival and success of the second bidder, and let ¯ denote the expected winning bid of the
second bidder. Then so long as ¯ > V T
0 (so that it pays for the unsuccessful initial bidder
to sell to the later bidder),
¯ ¼1 = Á1[®¯ V
I + (1 ¡ ®)(¯ V
I + V
T
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As a rough approximation we replace ¯ with our estimates of the expected price paid
by a successful ﬁrst bidder conditional on the arrival of a competing bidder, ¯ B3. The
unconditional probability of a second bidder winning is the probability that a second bidder
arrives multiplied by the probability given arrival that the second bidder wins, Pr(S2jµ1) =
Pr(Competing Bid Occurs)Pr(S2jµ3). Pr(Competing Bid Occurs) is estimated as 147=1018.
Thus, only one of the other two probabilities is a free variable. IRIM for diﬀerent possible
values of Pr(S2jµ3) are given in columns 5-7 of Table 10. A benchmark value for this
variable is :5, the case in which, given the arrival of a competing bidder, the ﬁrst and second
bidder have equal probabilities of winning. Column 6 gives the estimated improvement ratio
with the bidders’ actual initial shareholdings in the target. Column 7 provides alternative
numbers assuming larger initial shareholdings. For plausible parameter values, the estimated
value improvement is robust with respect to the possibility of sale of the initial bidder’s
toehold.
4. Valuation/success correlation
Finally, the success of the initial bidder is likely to be positively correlated with the value
improvement, because a high valuation ﬁrst bidder will probably be willing to oﬀer more.
The logit-based probability estimates, which generated similar results to simple estimates
based on ex post sample fractions addresses this issue to the extent that explanatory logit
variables such as the initial bid premium are correlated with the ﬁrst bidder’s valuation. In
any case, the potential bias is a subtle one, because IM estimates are based on the change
in probability of success when a competing bid occurs. Even if probabilities were mises-
timated across transactions, it is not clear that there would be any important, systematic
33misestimation in the changes in probabilities.37
Similarly, it can plausibly be argued that if improvements are common across bidders,
a high value improvement increases the probability of a competing bid arrives. Again, the
potential bias implied by this eﬀect is subtle, because the ex ante probability of a competing
bid is overestimated for some contests and underestimated for others.38 It therefore seems
unlikely that these eﬀects would have much eﬀect on inferences about value improvements.
In summary, several robustness checks with respect to several possible modelling variants
conﬁrm that the conclusion of positive average value improvements provided using the basic
model is highly robust. For plausible parameter values, all estimates of the average value
improvement are positive and substantial.
5 Summary and conclusions
Despite an extensive literature, the issue of whether tender oﬀers increase or decrease com-
bined average bidder and target value has remained unresolved. Past stock market based
studies have provided valuable information consistent with positive average improvements.
However, the conventional event study approach is subject to two important estimation
problems. The ﬁrst, the truncation dilemma, arises when the announcement of the event
does not ensure successful completion of the event. This forces the investigator to choose
between truncated event windows that measure only a part of the value eﬀect of a successful
transaction, and long-windows that introduce severe noise and benchmark errors.
The second problem is that event-related returns are infected with a bidder revelation
bias (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Roll, 1986; Jovanovic and
Braguinsky, 2002). Tender oﬀer bids are sometimes announced concurrently with other
disclosures; and a bid may in itself reveal information about the value of the bidder not
37The most plausible presumption is probably that the arrival of a competitor has a smaller impact
on probability of success when the valuation is high. Then for a high valuation ﬁrst bidder, the drop in
probability of success is overestimated, which implies that IRIM is an underestimate. (Because the negative
abnormal return is attributed excessively to the drop in probability of success rather than to a large value
improvement.) Conversely, for low (but positive) valuation ﬁrms, the drop in probability of success is
underestimated, so that IRIM is an overestimate. Under these conditions this potential bias changes the
relative magnitude of IRIM for diﬀerent ﬁrms, but it does not imply any obvious bias in overall sample
averages.
38If the true improvement is high, the arrival of a competing bid would be less of a surprise than our
calculations indicate. For such contests, the improvement is underestimated. On the other hand, if the
true improvement is low, the arrival of a competing bid would be more of a surprise than our calculations
indicate. For such contests, the improvement is overestimated. The eﬀect on overall sample averages is
unclear.
34arising from the combination, such as the bidder’s stand-alone cash ﬂow prospects or the
empire-building propensities of management.
This paper estimates whether and by how much tender oﬀers are perceived by investors
as improving combined equity value. We oﬀer an approach to estimating perceived value
improvements, the probability scaling method, that addresses the truncation dilemma. Fur-
thermore, we oﬀer an approach that addresses both the truncation dilemma and the bidder-
revelation bias. This approach, the intervention method, is based on a model of the stock
returns of an initial bidder when a competing bid occurs.
We apply both the traditional method and the two new methods to a sample of tender
oﬀers during 1962-2001. Perceived value improvements are much larger than traditional
methods indicate. As a result, even though the conventional method indicates that bidders
on average overpay, using our new methods we cannot reject the hypothesis that bidders on
average pay fair prices for targets.
Furthermore, traditional methods can lead to incorrect inferences about economic forces
in the takeover market. We identify several eﬀects (higher combined bidder-target stock
returns for hostile oﬀers, lower for equity oﬀers, and lower for diversifying oﬀers) that reﬂect
diﬀerences in revelation about stand-alone value, not gains from combination.
We also identify some factors that do aﬀect the gains from combination, not just revela-
tion about stand-alone value. Using all three approaches, acquisition of a smaller target by a
large bidder on average creates a smaller value improvement, measured as a fraction of com-
bined value, than combinations of similar-sized ﬁrms. But measured relative to the value of
the target, the mean estimated improvement is larger for such transactions. These ﬁndings
are consistent with the importance of both synergies and target-speciﬁc improvements such
as removal of bad management.
Furthermore, bidder announcement period returns and total value improvements are
negatively related to bidder Tobin’s Q (in contrast with evidence from the earlier samples
of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991)). Target announcement period
returns are negatively related to target Q, consistent with previous literature.
All else equal, the evidence of positive value improvements, and that improvements are
larger than estimates based on traditional unadjusted returns, tends to oppose highly re-
strictive regulation of takeovers. There are, however, other important policy considerations,
such as possible errors in market perceptions, possible redistributions of wealth from stake-
holders such as customers and employees, and between diﬀerent classes of securityholders,
the disciplinary or distortive eﬀects of the ex ante threat of takeover, and the ex ante costs
of locating targets.
The probability scaling method and the intervention method can be applied to test the
35relation of value improvements to other possible determinants. For example, an interesting
issue that could be addressed using these methods is whether the arrival of white knights
blocks superior hostile acquisitions. These new methods can also potentially be applied to
other corporate activities that are announced but are not always carried through, such as
repurchase programs, planned asset sales, planned development of new products, acquisition
programs, and many others.
36Appendix A: Numerical illustration of the probability scaling and
intervention methods
The basic ideas of PSM and IM can be illustrated by numerical examples.
The probability scaling method
Consider a bidder who does not own any shares of the target. Suppose that the stand-
alone value of the target is 100, the stand-alone value of the bidder is 200, and that the
transaction will create a value improvement of 40. Suppose that prior to the initial bid the
market assesses the probability of a bid to be close to zero, and that just after the initial bid
the probability of oﬀer success is perceived to be .6. Then the stock market’s assessment of
the combined bidder-target expected value prior to the initial bid is approximately
100 + 200 = 300:
Just after the initial bid, this assessment is revised to
100 + 200 + :6(40) = 324:
The combined bidder-target equity return is therefore
324
300
¡ 1 = 8:0%:
This is only a fraction of the percentage value improvement associated with a completed
takeover, which is 40=300 = 13:¯ 3% of combined value.
The PSM grosses up the equity return by the probability of success, which gives the




of combined bidder-target value.
The actual implementation of PSM also takes into account that the target return reﬂects
the market’s belief about the likelihood that the target will be acquired by any bidder, not
just the ﬁrst bidder. Subsection 2.3 derives PSM in detail.
The revelation bias
We now illustrate the revelation bias inherent in the conventional approach to estimating
takeover value improvements. To begin with, let there be no value improvement from
successful takeover, so that stand-alone and post-takeover discounted value of target cash
ﬂows are both $100. Suppose that prior to the initial bid, the market estimates the stand-
alone value of the bidder to be $200. Suppose that a bid reveals favorable news to the
market about stand-alone bidder value, so that the post-initial-bid market assessment of
stand-alone bidder value is $250. The $50 discrepancy is the eﬀect the bid has on the
market’s assessment of stand-alone value.
37The stock market’s assessment of combined bidder-target value prior to the initial bid is
100 + 200 = 300:
Just after the initial bid, this assessment is revised to
100 + 250 = 350:
The combined bidder-target equity return will therefore be
350
300
¡ 1 ¼ 16:7%:
If the revelation eﬀect of the initial bid is ignored, the researcher will wrongly attribute
this return to an expected value improvement of :166 £ $300 = $50 (50% of target value),
when in fact the improvement is zero. As Roll (1986) pointed out, even a modest revelation
bias for the bidder can create a large overestimate of the value improvement from takeover
measured relative to target value, since on average bidders are much larger than targets.
The intervention method
Since competition reduces a ﬁrst bidder’s probability of success, ceteris paribus its stock
price will drop if its value improvement is large compared to the expected price that will be
paid, and rise if the value improvement is less than the expected purchase price. Thus the
stock price reaction to a competing bid provides information about the value improvement.
However, holding probability of success constant, competition should hurt the ﬁrst bidder
to the extent that he is forced to pay more when he wins. The challenge for the intervention
method is to disentangle these two eﬀects.
After the initial bid, the market’s assessment of stand-alone bidder value is $250. We
will compare a case of positive value improvement, where the value of the target managed
by the bidder is $140, with the case of zero improvement, where the post-takeover NPV of
target cash ﬂows if managed by the bidder is $100.
Positive value improvement
Suppose that at the time of the initial oﬀer, the probability of the initial bidder succeed-
ing is .6, but that if a competitor makes a bid, this probability is only .4. (These overall
probabilities take into account the possibility that a competing bid may be forthcoming.)
Suppose that at the time of the initial oﬀer, the expected price that the ﬁrst bidder will have
to pay if he succeeds is $120, but that if a competitor arrives, this expected price paid by
the ﬁrst bidder rises to $130. We assume that regardless of the bidder’s method of payment,
the expected price ($120 or $130) refers to the actual price paid by the bidder at the time
of completion of the deal. Based on this information, the stock price of the bidder after
announcing his oﬀer rises to
250 + :6(140 ¡ 120) = 262:
If a competitor appears, the ﬁrst bidder’s stock price retreats to
250 + :4(140 ¡ 130) = 254:
38Thus, the ﬁrst bidder’s stock return on the arrival of a competing bidder is (254¡262)=262 ¼
¡3%.
The initial bidder’s stock return reﬂects the facts that when a competing bid arrives,
(1) the ﬁrst bidder will have to pay more if he succeeds, and (2) the ﬁrst bidder has a
lower probability of succeeding. Clearly point (1) contributes negatively to the ﬁrst bidder’s
return. Point (2) also contributes negatively to the stock return here, because a lower
probability of success prevents the bidder from realizing proﬁts. These proﬁts are the
diﬀerence between the improvement brought about by the ﬁrst bidder and the expected
price paid. Thus, the ﬁrst bidder’s stock return on the arrival of a competing bid reﬂects
the market’s assessment of the value improvement that the ﬁrst bidder can bring about.
Speciﬁcally, the larger the improvement, ceteris paribus, the more negative the return.
And if the improvement is smaller than the expected price, then point (2) will contribute
positively to the bidder’s return.
Zero value improvement
These points are illustrated by making one change in the example. Suppose now that
the takeover does not improve value, so the value of the target when acquired is the same
as its stand-alone value of $100. Replacing $140 with $100 in the above calculations shows
that the bidder’s stock return on the arrival of a competing bidder is 0%. The negative
eﬀect of the higher price that will be paid in the event of success is oﬀset by the positive
eﬀect of an increased probability of failure.
The intervention method uses ex post data to estimate the various parameters of this
numerical example: the unconditional probability of success of an initial bidder, the proba-
bility of success given the arrival of a competitor, the unconditional expected price paid by
an initial bidder given that he succeeds, and the expected price he pays if he succeeds given
that a competing bid occurs. Given these parameters (along with the initial shareholding of
the bidder in the target), the value improvement from the takeover implies a speciﬁc stock
return for the ﬁrst bidder. It is therefore possible to infer the size of the value improvement
from the observed stock return.
The above discussion is based on the distinction between creation of value and revelation
of information about value. It is possible that an action can create value as a direct result
of revealing value; this in no way obviates the need to distinguish the two concepts. For
example, if a takeover bid conveys to the market the idea that the bidder’s prospects are
good, customers or suppliers may be more willing to deal with the ﬁrm (e.g., Titman, 1984).
If so, even a manager whose sole objective is to maximize fundamental value may expend
resources in order to reveal information. Nevertheless, the value created by a corporate
action is in general diﬀerent from the value revealed. Generally, these quantities can have
diﬀerent orders of magnitude and need not have the same sign. Thus, the increase in stock
price associated with a corporate action is an invalid measure of the eﬀect of that action on
underlying value. Furthermore, even if the announcement of a takeover bid makes market
perceptions more favorable, and this change in perceptions in turn increased underlying
value signiﬁcantly, this value increase is not an actual beneﬁt from combination, but a
beneﬁt of favorable revelation.39 The intervention method (1) accommodates, but does not
39In the numerical example above, the increase in the market’s stand-alone valuation of bidder from 200
to 250 could reﬂect not the direct eﬀect on expectations of more favorable information, but the fact that
the bidder’s higher stock price may in itself help it to generate greater cash ﬂows as a stand-alone entity.
39require, possible eﬀects of value revelation on fundamental value; (2) accommodates, but
does not require signalling motivations; and (3) estimates only those value improvements
that result from combination of the two ﬁrms, not those that result from revelation about
stand-alone value.
Appendix B: Robustness of IM results with respect to alternative
parameter estimates
We analyze the robustness of the conclusion that the mean value improvement ratio
is positive with respect to the parameter estimates for ¯ R3, Á1;Á3; ¯ B1=V T
0 , and ¯ B3=V T
0 .
We conduct two experiments. First is a sensitivity analysis of IRIM with respect to the
probability of success unconditionally, Á1, and conditional on a competing bid, Á3; with
respect to the expected price paid unconditionally, ¯ B1=V T
0 , and conditional on a competing
bid, ¯ B3=V T
0 ; and with respect to the mean ﬁrst bidder stock return on announcement of a
competing bid, ¯ R3. Second, we compare our results to those implied by samples studied by
Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Betton and Eckbo (2000).
We examine the eﬀect of shifting each of these estimated parameters simultaneously in
the direction of lower IRIM. This check is stringent, since there is no reason to expect
estimation errors all to boost the IRIM. The results indicate that the conclusion that value
improvements are on average positive is not very sensitive to shifts in parameter estimates.
Even if all 4 of the estimated parameters are shifted by 12% of their respective mean values,
the mean estimated IRIM remains positive.40
A limitation of the intervention method is that it provides value estimates only in those
contests for which the intervention (competing bid) actually occurs. If contests that did not
enter the intervention sample are diﬀerent, the returns to the ﬁrst bidder in such contests
upon arrival of a competing bid would be systematically diﬀerent from the ﬁrst bidder
returns in the actual competing bid sample. While it is impossible to address this issue
conclusively, the conclusion of positive value improvements with respect to the estimated
stock returns is extremely robust. The sensitivity to ¯ R3 provides an indication of whether the
conclusions we derive are likely to be sample speciﬁc. We recalculated IRIMs substituting
ﬁctional alternative values for ¯ R3 for all ﬁrst bidders. Both the mean and median value
improvements remain positive even for an abnormal return as high as +3:5%, and a majority
are positive even for an abnormal return as high as +7%.41 These robustness checks support
the conclusion that value improvements are on average positive and substantial.
The conclusion of positive average value improvements applies in other samples as well.
Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) (BSV) analyze an exhaustive sample of hostile takeover
contests in the U.S. during 1984 through 1986 where the purchase price was $50 million or
more. Their sample consists of 61 contests: 50 targets were acquired and 11 remained
40The probability that all 4 misestimates are in the upward direction is (1=2)4 = :0625; imposing the
condition that the magnitudes of the misestimates be greater than 12% would reduce the probability much
further.
41Intuitively, the reason that the estimates remain positive even when intervention returns are high is
that the mean bid premia are very substantial. Thus, even if the value improvement is positive, if it is
smaller than the expected price to be paid, the arrival of a competing bid and the associated reduction in
the probability of the ﬁrst bidder succeeding can be good news.
40independent. The ﬁrst bidder was successful in 29 of the 61 contests. Competing bids were
observed in 30 of the 61 contests. The ﬁrst bidder prevailed in the face of a competing oﬀer
in nine instances.
The above ﬁgures indicate that in the BSV sample Á1, the probability of success of the
ﬁrst bidder in the full sample, is 29/61 or .4754. Also, Á3, the probability of success of the
ﬁrst bidder in the presence of a competing bidder, is 9/30 or .3000. Similarly, we estimate
¯ B1=V T
0 , and ¯ B3=V T
0 implied by the BSV sample. We then substitute these parameter
estimates into the IRIM formula transaction by transaction in our full dataset to generate
an alternative set of IRIM’s.
The estimated input parameters from the BSV sample period (1984-6) are fairly similar
to those of this study. When the BSV sample parameter estimates are substituted into the
IRIM formula (11), the inference about IRIM is unchanged, that the mean IRIM is positive.
Simultaneously substituting the BSV estimates for ¯ B1=V T
0 , ¯ B3=V T
0 , Á1, and Á3 with other
mean parameters generates a mean (median) IRIM of 9.0 (9.9).
Betton and Eckbo (2000) examine a sample of tender oﬀers from 1971-1990. They
report that in their sample, the unconditional probability of bidder success was .6386, and
conditional on a competing bid was only .1682. The unconditional expected premium was
56.96%, and conditional on a competing bid was 85.60%. Applying these ﬁgures to our
overall sample transaction by transaction in the IRIM formula gives an average IRIM of
17.5% (15.3%). This is somewhat higher than the estimates of about 13-15% using our own
sample.
To summarize, in this appendix we have performed robustness checks by varying esti-
mated parameters, both individually and simultaneously; and by using parameter estimates
obtained from the BSV and the Betton and Eckbo (2000) samples. These analyses all
conﬁrm that value improvements were on average positive.
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Fig. 1. Number of attempted tender offers. Sample includes 1018 tender offers where both bidder and target were listed on 
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% of attempted takeovers considered hostile by target management
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Fig. 2. Sample description. Sample includes 1018 tender offers where both bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, 











Fig. 3. Mean shareholder returns (%). Announcement period return is the market-model cumulative abnormal return for the 
target, bidder or combined, over the period five days before the first bid through five days after. Combined return is the 
weighted average of target and bidder returns, where their weights are their market values as a fraction of the total target and 





































Fig. 4. Mean dollar returns. Target dollar return is target market value (six days before the first bid) multiplied by target CAR; 
similarly for bidder and combined dollar returns. CAR is the market-model cumulative abnormal return for the target, bidder or 
combined, over the period five days before the first bid through five days after. Combined return is the weighted average of target 
and bidder CARs, where their weights are their market values as a fraction of the total target and bidder market value. Sample 






Fig. 5. Histograms of value improvement measures. Sample includes 1018 tender offers where both bidder and target were 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1962-2001; additionally, for IR
IM the sample is restricted to cases where 
there was a competing bid for the target.   
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Summary statistics of tender offer sample 
Number of attempted offers, successful offers, offers that involved two or more bidders, offers that were considered as hostile 
by target management, and offers in which the target litigated against the acquisition attempt. Sample includes tender offers 
where both bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1962-2001.  




successful offers  
(where the bidder 
acquired at least 




offers that had 









where the target 
litigated 
Number of all 
cash offers 
1962  1  0  0  0 0 1 
1963  9  5  1  2 0 9 
1964  4  3  0  1 0 4 
1965 11  9  1  2  1  10 
1966 13  7  2  4  1  12 
1967 18  8  11  8  4  16 
1968 31  20  13  9  8  16 
1969  10  6  3  1 2 4 
1970  8  6  0  2 3 6 
1971  2  2  0  0 0 1 
1972  8  5  0  1 2 6 
1973 17  6  2  4  5  16 
1974 22  9  5  6  5  21 
1975 12  5  3  3  9  11 
1976 19  8  3  6  6  17 
1977 18  8  5  3  4  18 
1978 21  6  5  6  7  14 
1979  19  8  4  11 9 16 
1980  4  2  2  2 1 4 
1981 13  5  9  10  8  3 
1982  13 12 0  2 3 2 
1983  10  9  2  4 2 0 
1984  9  8  1  2 0 1 
1985  40  19  7 12 15 29 
1986  59  38  8 14 15 51 
1987 42  32  5  9  12  38 
1988  73  43  17  23 29 61 
1989  42  24  6 11 15 31 
1990 20  12  1  1  5  15 
1991  12  8  2  1 8 3 
1992  10  8  0  1 3 7 
1993 17  13  2  2  6  11 
1994 34  25  4  9  10  30 
1995  42  36  3 12 13 30 
1996 46  41  2  6  6  30 
1997  65  46  8  13 5 38 
1998 56  46  2  6  5  42 
1999 74  65  4  6  4  53 
2000 61  51  1  5  1  37 
2001 33  26  3  1  0  17 
1962-2001  1018  690  147  221 232 731 Table 2 
Panel A: Shareholder returns in attempted tender offers 
Shareholder returns over various sub-periods in attempted tender offers. Sample includes 1018 tender offers where both bidder and 























Number of attempted 
tender offers    71  176 45 214 84 139  210 79  1018 
Bidder 
  Mean CAR (%)  3.29 0.05 -1.42 -0.49 -1.78 0.98 0.97 -0.81 0.18 
  Z-statistic   5.47 0.48 -1.74 -1.00 -3.00 1.22 1.83 -1.01 0.91 
  Median CAR (%)  1.62 -0.17 -1.72 -1.15 -1.04 0.91 -0.30 -0.56 -0.30 
  % positive  63.6  48.8 31.8 44.4 41.7 52.9 48.3 46.8 47.8 
  Binomial p  0.04  0.81 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.55 0.68 0.65 0.17 
  Mean dollar return   15.1 23.3 -63.4 -53.4 -56.9 89.5  -190.0  -225.0  -59.2 
  Median dollar return  9.9 -0.7 -6.8 -2.9 -8.1 4.0 -2.0 -3.6 -1.2 
Target  
  Mean CAR (%)  17.96  27.97 31.90 25.61 29.08 31.92 33.18 44.78 30.01 
  Z-statistic   29.65  49.62 28.71 51.06 30.97 40.10 46.70 27.17  110.39 
  Median CAR (%)  17.79  22.99 31.61 21.89 28.25 29.27 29.46 39.81 26.10 
  % positive  94.0  93.6 93.3 93.0 89.2 94.2 96.2 97.4 94.0 
  Binomial p  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Mean dollar return   87.9  74.0  379.7 138.9 178.2 200.0 155.0 201.9 155.0 
  Median dollar return  51.2  32.3 91.1 37.3 27.9 44.1 46.2 47.2 41.2 
Combined (CIBR) 
  Mean CAR (%)  7.45  6.40 8.12 5.19 3.59 5.05 4.61 3.57 5.27 
  Z-statistic   10.60  11.64 8.04 11.73 4.48  8.78  8.31  2.25 23.57 
  Median CAR (%)  6.42  4.20 8.22 3.97 1.76 4.04 2.93 3.00 3.69 
  % positive  87.3  73.0 75.0 71.7 59.8 77.4 68.1 58.7 71.1 
  Binomial p  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 
  Mean dollar return   103.3  99.0 321.3 84.6 124.3  291.6  -248.6  -25.3 53.1 
  Median dollar return  77.9  26.7 44.2 22.8  5.4  55.5 35.4 21.3 32.0 
 
 
CAR is the market-model cumulative abnormal return for the target, bidder, or combined, over the period five days before the first bid 
through five days after. 
Target dollar return is target market value (six days before the first bid) times target CAR; similarly for bidder and combined dollar 
returns. 
Combined CAR (CIBR) is a weighted average of target and bidder CARs, where their weights are their market values as a fraction of 
the total target and bidder market value.   
Combined dollar return is the sum of target and bidder dollar returns. The target mean dollar return and the bidder mean dollar return 
in the above table may not exactly sum to the combined dollar return because of missing data for target or bidder in some cases. 
Binomial p is the significance level for the two-tail Fisher sign test that tests whether the median CAR is different from zero. 
 
 Table 2 
Panel B: Longer-window shareholder returns in attempted tender offers 
Shareholder returns over various (longer) windows in attempted tender offers. Sample includes 1018 tender offers where both bidder 
and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1962-2001.  
 
Window: From T days prior  
to the first bid announcement through one day after    
   T = 90  T = 60  T = 30  T = 15  T = 10   T = 5  T = 1 
Bidder 
  Mean CAR (%)  -0.15 0.22 1.11 0.95 0.83 0.70 0.28 
  Z-statistic   0.81 0.96 2.81 2.94 2.96 3.24 2.31 
  Median CAR (%)  0.26 0.68 0.42 0.43 0.31 0.16 0.08 
  % positive  50.4 51.3 51.2 53.0 52.1 50.6 50.7 
  Binomial p  0.82 0.43 0.47 0.06 0.19 0.73 0.68 
Target 
  Mean CAR (%)  38.92 38.47 36.39 33.06 31.27 28.89 24.47 
  Z-statistic   49.88 59.90 78.67 98.00  110.17  133.64  172.45 
  Median CAR (%)  37.04 35.35 32.79 29.01 28.21 24.68 20.07 
  % positive  88.2 91.5 93.9 94.8 93.9 95.0 93.5 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Combined (CIBR) 
  Mean CAR (%)  6.65 6.88 7.12 6.23 5.88 5.32 4.28 
  Z-statistic   11.28 13.49 18.68 22.26 24.90 29.42 36.57 
  Median CAR (%)  7.05 7.09 6.35 4.76 4.44 3.75 2.95 
  % positive  62.9 67.2 70.7 72.6 73.4 72.4 74.8 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
CAR is the market-model cumulative abnormal return for the target, bidder, or combined, over the period T days before the first bid 
through one day after. 
Combined CAR (CIBR) is a weighted average of target and bidder CARs, where their weights are their market values as a fraction of 
the total target and bidder market value.   
Binomial p is the significance level for the two-tail Fisher sign test that tests whether the median CAR is different from zero. 
 Table 3 
Logit model estimates of the probability of success of the first bidder 
Logit model estimates of the probability of success of the first bidder unconditionally (Models A1 and A2), and conditional on 
whether a competing bid occurs (Model B). Sample size is 1018, and includes tender offers during 1962-2001 where both target and 




Independent Variable  Coefficient p-value 
Litigation -.488  .012 
Hostile -1.655  .000 
Alpha -.349  .432 
Effective premium  .011  .000 
Relative size  .003  .052 
Constant .936  .000 




Independent Variable  Coefficient p-value 
Hostile -1.885  .000 
Alpha -.449  .309 
Effective premium  .011  .000 
Relative size  .003  .042 
Constant .881  .000 




Independent Variable  Coefficient p-value 
Litigation -.321  .114 
Competing bid  -1.751  .000 
Hostile -1.404  .000 
Alpha -.614  .168 
Effective premium  .012  .000 
Relative size  .002  .100 
Constant 1.101  .000 
Pseudo-R2 =.1969 . Percentage predicted=79.9% 
 
 
Hostile = 1, if the target management opposes the first bidder, 0 otherwise. 
Alpha = fraction of the target held by the first bidder. 
Effective premium = initial bid price offered relative to the pre-bid market price of the target, multiplied by the percentage of target 
shares sought by the bidder through the tender offer. 
Litigation = 1, if the target files a lawsuit against the first bidder, 0 otherwise. 
Competing bid = 1, if a competing bidder arrives, 0 otherwise. 




Panel A: Value improvement measures and comparisons by sub-periods 
Implicit market estimates of the value improvement as a result of the takeover (IR
IM), combined initial bid returns 
(CIBR), and probability-adjusted combined initial bid returns (IR
PSM). Sample includes tender offers where both 
bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1962-2001; additionally, for IR
IM the 
sample is restricted to cases where there was a competing bid for the target.  All improvement ratios are expressed as 
a % of target and bidder market values. 






















  Mean (%)  15.62 12.90 12.09 14.48 11.54 10.86 10.49 10.98 13.05 
  Median (%)  15.79  12.33 8.51 14.26 9.24  9.99  9.70 11.48  12.38 
  % positive  100.0  100.0  91.7 89.2 88.9 90.9 85.7  100.0  93.6 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.00 
  Sample size  18 36 12 37  9  11 14  4 141 
CIBR  
  Mean (%)  7.45 6.40 8.12 5.19 3.59 5.05 4.61 3.57 5.27 
  Median (%)  6.42 4.20 8.22 3.97 1.76 4.04 2.93 3.00 3.69 
  % positive  87.3 73.0 75.0 71.7 59.8 77.4 68.1 58.7 71.1 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 
  Sample size  63 159 44 212 82 137  204 75 976 
IR
IM – CIBR  
  Mean (%)  7.06 4.94 -3.30 3.21 6.53 7.43 0.66 9.05 4.04 
  Median (%)  8.57 4.53 -2.37 3.71 7.36 8.37 2.66 4.47 3.74 
  % positive  83.3 66.7 41.7 56.8 77.8 72.7 64.3 50.0 64.5 
  Binomial p  0.01 0.07 0.77 0.51 0.18 0.23 0.42 1.00 0.00 
  Sample size  18 36 12 37  9  11 14  4 141 
IR
PSM  
  Mean (%)  11.01  8.86  13.24  7.82 5.07 6.38 5.82 3.82 7.28 
  Median (%)  8.42 5.49 8.82 5.16 2.07 5.19 3.22 3.17 4.63 
  % positive  87.3 73.0 75.0 71.7 59.8 77.4 68.1 58.7 71.1 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 
  Sample size  63 159 44 212 82 137  204 75 976 
IR
PSM – CIBR  
  Mean (%)  3.57 2.46 5.12 2.63 1.47 1.33 1.21 0.25 2.02 
  Median (%)  1.25 0.46 1.08 0.35 0.01 0.38 0.10 0.00 0.22 
  % positive  81.0 63.5 75.0 67.0 51.2 74.5 56.9 42.7 63.4 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 
  Sample size  63 159 44 212 82 137  204 75 976 
IR
PSM - IR
IM (Estimated Revelation Bias) 
  Mean (%)  -2.75 -2.14  17.25 5.10 -1.53 -6.65 6.11 -7.88 1.67 
  Median (%)  -4.98 -1.71  15.90 2.94 -5.35 -5.45 4.79 -3.88 1.10 
  % positive  44.4 44.4 83.3 62.2 44.4 27.3 57.1 50.0 52.5 
  Binomial p  0.81 0.62 0.04 0.19 1.00 0.23 0.79 1.00 0.61 
  Sample size  18 36 12 37  9  11 14  4 141 
Binomial p is the significance level for the two-tail Fisher sign test that tests whether the median is different from zero. 
CIBR = Combined Initial Bid Return = target CAR* (target market value/target and bidder market values) + bidder 
CAR * (bidder market value/target and bidder market values). CAR is the market-model cumulative abnormal return 
for the target or bidder over the period five days before the first bid through five days after. 
IR
PSM = (CIBR)/(Probability the first bidder succeeds unconditionally + Probability a later bidder succeeds). The 
probability of success of the first bidder is estimated from Logit model A2 in Table 3. The probability a later bid 
succeeds is estimated from Betton-Eckbo (2000), and is .1463. 
Parameter inputs for IR
IM are estimated using sample means (the baseline specification).Table 4 
Panel B: Value improvement measures and comparisons with different parameter specifications 
Implicit market estimates of the value improvement as a result of the takeover (IR
IM), combined initial bid returns 
(CIBR), and probability-adjusted combined initial bid returns (IR
PSM). Sample includes tender offers where both 
bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1962-2001; additionally, for IR
IM the 
sample is restricted to cases where there was a competing bid for the target. All improvement ratios are expressed as 
a % of target and bidder market values. 
  
Parameter inputs for IR
IM are 
derived from regression/logit 
models A1 and B in Table 3 
Parameter inputs for IR
IM are 
sample means  
IR
IM  
  Mean  (%)  14.76 13.05 
  Median (%)   13.81 12.38 
  % positive  85.9 93.6 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 
  Sample size  135 141 
CIBR 
  Mean  (%)  5.27 5.27 
  Median (%)   3.69 3.69 
  % positive  71.1 71.1 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 
  Sample size  976 976 
IR
IM – CIBR  
  Mean  (%)  5.69 4.04 
  Median (%)   5.04 3.74 
  % positive  66.7 64.5 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 
  Sample size  135 141 
IR
PSM 
  Mean  (%)  7.28 7.28 
  Median (%)   4.63 4.63 
  % positive  71.1 71.1 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 
  Sample size  976 976 
IR
PSM - CIBR 
  Mean  (%)  2.02 2.02 
  Median (%)   0.22 0.22 
  % positive  63.4 63.4 
  Binomial p  0.00 0.00 
  Sample size  976 976 
IR
PSM - IR
IM (Estimated Revelation Bias) 
  Mean  (%)  0.28 1.67 
  Median (%)   -1.06 1.10 
  % positive  48.1 52.5 
  Binomial p  0.73 0.61 
  Sample size  135 141 
Binomial p is the significance level for the two-tail Fisher sign test that tests whether the median is different from zero. 
CIBR = Combined Initial Bid Return = target CAR* (target market value/target and bidder market values) + bidder 
CAR * (bidder market value/target and bidder market values). CAR is the market-model cumulative abnormal return 
for the target or bidder over the period five days before the first bid through five days after. 
IR
PSM = (CIBR)/(Probability the first bidder succeeds unconditionally + Probability a later bidder succeeds). The 
probability of success of the first bidder is estimated from Logit model A2 in Table 3. The probability a later bid 
succeeds is estimated from Betton-Eckbo (2000), and is .1463. 
The estimated IR
IM are not significantly different in the two columns at the 10 percent level.  
 
Table 5 
The relation between value improvements and hostility, method of payment, and time periods 
Implicit market estimates of the value improvement as a result of the takeover (IR
IM), combined initial bid returns 
(CIBR), and probability-adjusted combined initial bid returns (IR
PSM) for hostile/non-hostile, cash/stock/mixed, pre-
Williams Act (pre July 1968) / post-Williams Act, pre March 2000/post March 2000. The value improvement 
estimates CIBR, IR
PSM, and IR
IM are defined in the legend of Table 4, Panel A. 
 
Panel A: Sample includes 1018 tender offers where both bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or 




















  Mean  (%)  8.43*** 4.38***  5.79
#*** 4.42
#♦♦♦ -0.54
♦♦♦*** 7.45* 5.11*  5.41  3.57 
  Median (%)  7.06*** 3.04***  4.14
#*** 3.12
#♦♦♦ -0.40
♦♦♦*** 6.42*** 3.52*** 3.78*  3.00* 
  Sample size  213 763  701  202  39  63 913 901 75 
IR
PSM 
  Mean  (%)  16.34*** 4.75***  7.97
#*** 5.83
#♦♦♦ -0.50
♦♦♦*** 11.01** 7.02** 7.57** 3.82** 
  Median (%)  13.68*** 3.27***  5.30
#*** 3.72
#♦♦♦ -0.45
♦♦♦*** 8.42*** 4.41*** 4.78**  3.17** 
  Sample size  213 763  701  202  39  63 913 901 75 
Bidder CAR 
  Mean  (%)  -0.95** 0.49**  0.76
##** -0.77
## -2.73**  3.29*** -0.04***  0.27  -0.81 
  Median (%)  -1.15** -0.17**  0.05
##** -0.78
## -1.68**  1.62*** -0.44***  -0.29  -0.56 
  Sample size  214 782  716  205  41  66 930 917 79 
Target CAR 
  Mean  (%)  28.80 30.35 31.60
#*** 28.26
#♦♦♦ 12.35
♦♦♦*** 17.96*** 30.86*** 28.77*** 44.78***
  Median (%)  25.99 26.10 28.14
#*** 25.52
#♦♦♦ 11.52
♦♦♦*** 17.79*** 28.01*** 25.30*** 39.81***
  Sample size  220 787  723  205  44  67 940 929 78 
 
*, **, *** indicate significant difference between the two sub-groups (hostile/non-hostile, cash/stock, pre-/ post-
Williams Act, pre-/post-March 2000) at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
#, ##, ### indicate significant difference between cash and mixed sub-groups at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, 
respectively. 




(Table 5 continued) 





















  Mean  (%)  13.59 12.31  13.49  10.99  16.55  15.62 12.68 13.11  10.98 
  Median (%)  14.03 10.94  13.64
# 9.59
#♦ 16.28
♦ 15.79  11.69  12.38  11.48 
  Sample size  82 59  100  24  8  18  123  137  4 
CIBR 
  Mean  (%)  10.35* 7.19*  9.52  7.20  3.72  8.56  9.08  9.22  1.94 
  Median (%)  10.46** 6.41**  7.81*  5.81  -1.18*  8.26  7.65  7.65  6.01 
  Sample size  82 60  101  24  8  18  124  138  4 
IR
PSM 
  Mean  (%)  19.65*** 7.93***  15.50*  11.63  3.34*  12.87  14.96  15.03  3.10 
  Median (%)  18.30*** 7.08***  10.64**  6.73
♦ -1.21
♦** 9.32 10.50 10.10 6.60 
  Sample size  82 60  101  24  8  18  124  138  4 
IR
PSM - IR
IM (Estimated Revelation Bias) 
  Mean  (%)  6.06*** -4.42***  2.06**  0.64
♦ -13.21
♦** -2.75  2.32  1.95  -7.88 
  t-statistic  2.98 -2.75  1.24  0.18  -2.70  -0.81 1.50 1.36  -0.72 
  Median (%)  5.42*** -4.01***  1.77***  -3.38
♦♦ -11.76
♦♦*** -4.98 1.70  1.10 -3.88 
  Binomial p  0.02 0.07  0.37  0.54  0.29  0.81 0.47 0.61  1.00 
  Sample size  82 59  100  24  8  18  123  137  4 
Bidder CAR 
  Mean  (%)  -1.51** 1.74**  -0.20  1.75  -4.15  2.63  -0.58  -0.14  0.04 
  Median (%)  -1.43** 0.71**  -0.59**  0.75
♦♦ -5.15
♦♦** 0.46  -0.95 -0.79 5.95 
  Sample size  83 61  102  25  8  20  124  140  4 
Target CAR 
  Mean  (%)  30.68 28.48 31.99*** 25.61
♦♦ 8.00
♦♦*** 19.75** 31.35** 29.18* 49.89* 
  Median (%)  28.77* 22.40* 28.37
#*** 21.47
#♦♦ 3.78
♦♦*** 21.06** 28.37**  27.37  33.94 
  Sample size  84 61  103  24  9  20  125  141  4 
 
 The mean Estimated Revelation Bias (IR
PSM -IR
IM ) may not equal the difference in means between the IR
PSM and 
IR
IM entries due to different sample size for IR
PSM and IR
IM.  The median of IR
PSM -IR
IM generally does not equal the 
difference in medians between the IR
PSM and IR
IM entries.  
t-statistic is the Student’s t value that tests whether the mean is different from zero. 
Binomial p is the significance level for the two-tail Fisher sign test that tests whether the median revelation bias is 
different from zero. 
*, **, *** indicate significant difference between the two sub-groups (hostile/non-hostile, cash/stock, pre-/ post-
Williams Act, pre-/post-March 2000) at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
#, ##, ### indicate significant difference between cash and mixed sub-groups at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, 
respectively. 
♦, ♦♦, ♦♦♦ indicate significant difference between stock and mixed sub-groups at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, 
respectively.   
Table 6 
The effect of diversification on value improvements 
 “Same industry” is measured two ways: First, the same 4-digit COMPUSTAT SIC codes for the target and bidder. 
Second, the same 3-digit COMPUSTAT SIC codes for the target and bidder. Implicit market estimates of the value 
improvement as a result of the takeover (IR
IM), combined initial bid returns (CIBR), and probability-adjusted 
combined initial bid returns (IR
PSM). These value improvement estimates are defined in the legend of Table 4, Panel 
A. 
 
Panel A: Sample includes tender offers where both bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ 
during 1962-2001. 
 











  Mean  (%)  6.23* 4.96* 6.20* 4.87* 
  Median (%)  4.62** 3.31** 4.60** 3.26** 
  Sample size   254 715 307 662 
IR
PSM 
  Mean  (%)  8.26 6.97 8.17 6.91 
  Median (%)  5.39* 4.12*  5.37**  4.02** 
  Sample size   254 715 307 662 
Bidder CAR 
  Mean  (%)  0.76 0.00 0.87 -0.11 
  Median (%)  0.92** -0.47** 0.77** -0.51** 
  Sample size   260 729 314 675 
Target CAR 
  Mean  (%)  29.45 30.34 30.84 29.77 
  Median (%)  28.37 25.84  29.18*  25.19* 
  Sample size   263 736 317 682 
 
*, **, *** indicate significant difference between same- and cross-industry tender offers at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
(Table 6 continued) 
Panel B: Sub-sample includes tender offers where there was a competing bid for the target. 
 












  Mean  (%)  12.65 13.16 12.29 13.33 
  Median (%)  12.77 11.88 12.47 12.14 
  Sample size   31 109 38 102 
CIBR 
  Mean  (%)  11.01 8.51  11.66*  8.10* 
  Median (%)  12.13 7.28  11.81**  6.98** 
  Sample size   31 110 38 103 
IR
PSM 
  Mean  (%)  19.13 13.52  20.16**  12.76** 
  Median (%)  14.17* 8.96*  16.46**  8.33** 
  Sample size   31 110 38 103 
IR
PSM - IR
IM (Estimated Revelation Bias) 
  Mean  (%)  6.48* 0.39*  7.87***  -0.55*** 
  t-statistic  1.91 0.25 2.63 -0.35 
  Median (%)  5.72* -0.02*  6.52***  -1.17*** 
  Binomial p  0.15 1.00 0.07 0.77 
  Sample size  31 109 38 102 
 Bidder CAR 
  Mean  (%)  1.25 -0.50  2.01*  -0.90* 
  Median (%)  1.53* -0.95*  1.74**  -0.99** 
  Sample size   31 112 38 105 
Target CAR 
  Mean  (%)  29.55 29.95 30.39 29.67 
  Median (%)  30.91 25.85 30.22 24.67 
  Sample size   31 113 38 106 
 
The mean Estimated Revelation Bias (IR
PSM -IR
IM ) may not equal the difference in means between the IR
PSM and 
IR
IM entries owing to different sample size for IR
PSM and IR
IM.  The median of IR
PSM -IR
IM generally does not equal 
the difference in medians between the IR
PSM and IR
IM entries.  
t-statistic is the Student’s t value that tests whether the mean is different from zero. 
Binomial p is the significance level for the two-tail Fisher sign test that tests whether the median revelation bias is 
different from zero. 
*, **, *** indicate significant difference between same- and cross-industry tender offers at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, 
respectively. Table 7 
The relation between value improvements and relative size 
Implicit market estimates of the value improvement as a result of the takeover (IR
IM), combined initial bid returns 
(CIBR), and probability-adjusted combined initial bid returns (IR
PSM) over various relative size of bidder to target. 
These value improvement estimates are defined in the legend of Table 4, Panel A. Sample includes 1018 tender 
offers where both bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1962-2001; additionally, 
for IR
IM the sample is restricted to cases where there was a competing bid for the target.  
 
Panel A: Sample includes 1018 tender offers where both bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ during 1962-2001. 
   Ratio of bidder-size to target-size 
  < 0.7   0.7 - 1.5  1.5 - 5.0  > 5 
CIBR 
  Mean  (%)  14.95  11.79  6.87  1.40 
  Median (%)   12.79  11.88  6.19  1.51 
  Sample size  85  126  240  525 
IR
PSM 
  Mean  (%)  22.06  17.19  9.11  1.68 
  Median (%)   16.68  15.45  7.03  1.73 
  Sample size  85  126  240  525 
Bidder CAR 
  Mean  (%)  3.75  2.26  -1.16  -0.47 
  Median (%)   1.74  1.81  -1.53  -0.41 
  Sample size  85  127  240  526 
Target CAR 
  Mean  (%)  18.96  21.92  29.21  34.59 
  Median (%)   16.92  20.02  25.11  30.22 
  Sample size  85  126  241  527 
 
Panel B: Sub-sample includes tender offers where there was a competing bid for the target. 
   Ratio of bidder-size to target-size 
  < 0.7   0.7 - 1.5  1.5 - 5.0  > 5 
 IR
IM 
  Mean  (%)  25.87 16.74  9.71  5.93 
  Median (%)   26.73 16.75  9.64  5.39 
  Sample size  22 31 61 27 
CIBR 
  Mean  (%)  16.77 12.01  7.69  2.13 
  Median (%)   19.08 11.61  6.29  2.12 
  Sample size  22 32 61 27 
IR
PSM  
  Mean  (%)  27.51 20.10 12.16  3.60 
  Median (%)   26.40 14.83  8.14  3.40 
  Sample size  22 32 61 27 
Bidder CAR  
  Mean  (%)  1.22 0.97 -1.34  -0.50 
  Median (%)   -0.10 -0.25 -2.08 0.05 
  Sample size  22 32 61 27 
Target CAR 
  Mean  (%)  22.25 23.30 32.36 38.65 
  Median (%)   23.82 21.36 30.09 30.62 
  Sample size  22 32 61 27  
Table 8 
Determinants of returns and value improvements 
Least squares regression results of combined initial bid returns (CIBR), and probability-adjusted combined initial 
bid returns (IR
PSM), bidder and target abnormal returns against various takeover-specific variables. Sample includes 
tender offers where both bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1962-2001 (t-
statistics in parentheses.)  Sample includes tender offers where bidder and target Tobin’s Q and leverage ratios are 
available. Industries are classified according to 3-digit COMPUSTAT SIC codes. 
 
  Dependent Variable 










Hostile   0.50 6.93 1.05 7.63 -1.63 5.93 
   (0.63) (6.62) (1.12) (6.00) (-1.83) (2.46) 
Cash  2.31 3.17 2.69 3.86 2.28 2.77 
   (2.97) (3.12) (3.05) (3.22) (2.71) (1.22) 
Stock   -5.12 -6.34 -4.81 -5.20 -2.41  -16.05 
    (-3.14) (-2.96) (-2.20) (-1.76) (-1.16) (-2.86) 
Pre-Williams Act   1.00 1.55 2.98 7.18 4.54 -1.04 
  (0.76) (0.89) (0.84) (1.49) (1.34) (-0.11) 
Post-March 2000   2.74 3.24 2.31 2.48 -0.05  11.22 
  (2.37) (2.14) (1.72) (1.36) (-0.04) (3.24) 
Same Industry   1.60 1.85 1.37 1.47 2.11 0.79 
   (2.42) (2.13) (1.78) (1.42) (2.89) (0.40) 
Log of Relative Size   -2.74 -3.35 -2.53 -3.10 -0.36 3.58 
   (-14.51) (-13.53) (-11.14) (-10.06)  (-1.69)  (6.13) 
Log of Target Size  -0.69 -0.65 -0.65 -0.50 -0.61 -1.16 
    (-3.05) (-2.21) (-2.41) (-1.38) (-2.40) (-1.69) 
Bidder Tobin’s Q      -0.28 -0.39 -0.38 -0.16 
       (-2.66) (-2.73) (-3.72) (-0.57) 
Target Tobin’s Q       0.12 0.14 0.13 -0.97 
       (0.74) (0.62) (0.83) (-2.26) 
Constant  11.78 12.61 11.64 11.93  2.71  28.47 
   (7.27) (5.93) (6.13) (4.63) (1.50) (5.84) 
Sample Size  935 935 634 634 636 635 
Adjusted R
2  .2206 .2699 .2242 .2751 .0530 .1147 
 
Hostile = 1 if the offer is viewed as hostile by target management; 0 otherwise. 
Cash = 1 if the offer is all cash; 0 otherwise. 
Stock = 1 if the offer is all stock; 0 otherwise. 
Pre-Williams Act = 1 if the offer was made prior to July 1968; 0 otherwise. 
Post-March 2000 = 1 if the offer was made after March 2000; 0 otherwise. 
Same Industry = 1 if the bidder and target are in the same 3-digit COMPUSTAT SIC code industry; 0 otherwise. 
Relative Size =acquirer market value / target market value.  
Tobin’s Q = (market value of equity +long-term debt + short-term debt + preferred stock)/ total assets.  
The value improvement estimates CIBR and IR
PSM are defined in the legend of Table 4, Panel A. 
   
Table 9 
The difference between value improvement measures and toehold-adjusted bid premium 
Value improvement measures include the implicit market estimates of the value improvement as a result of the 
takeover (IR
IM), combined initial bid returns (CIBR), and probability-adjusted combined initial bid returns (IR
PSM). 
These value improvement estimates are defined in the legend of Table 4, Panel A. Sample includes tender offers 
where both bidder and target were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1962-2001; additionally, for 
IR
IM the sample is restricted to cases where there was a competing bid for the target.  All improvement ratios are 
expressed as a % of combined target and bidder market value. 




















CIBR – ToePrem (full sample) 
  Mean (%)  -0.11 -4.41 -2.34 -4.26 -3.53 -1.05 -1.53 -1.96 -2.66 
  Median (%)  0.35 -2.33 -4.73 -3.13 -2.61 0.57 -1.62 -0.84 -1.93 
  % positive  54.2 34.5 27.3 31.8 30.9 54.7 42.2 47.3 40.0 
 p-value of mean  0.91 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.20 0.00 
  Binomial p  0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.03 0.73 0.00 
  Sample size  59 145 44 211 81 137  204 74 955 
IR
PSM – ToePrem (full sample)  
  Mean (%)  3.70 -1.71 2.77 -1.62 -2.04 0.29 -0.33 -1.70 -0.59 
  Median (%)  3.46 -0.23 -1.82 -1.59 -1.04 1.19 -0.93 -0.78 -0.48 
  % positive  64.4 49.0 45.5 42.2 39.5 58.4 45.6 47.3 48.0 
 p-value of mean  0.02 0.17 0.32 0.07 0.06 0.74 0.67 0.28 0.14 
  Binomial p  0.04 0.87 0.65 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.23 0.73 0.22 
  Sample size  59 145 44 211 81 137  204 74 955 
IR
IM – ToePrem (competing bid sub-sample)  
  Mean (%)  5.46 0.03 -2.47 -7.27 3.86 -0.90 -3.38 7.79 -1.45 
  Median (%)  6.42 1.67 -7.09 -3.82 2.32 3.14 -2.07 6.64 -0.07 
  % positive  82.4 58.1 16.7 29.7 66.7 54.5 42.9  100.0  49.6 
 p-value of mean  0.00 0.99 0.76 0.02 0.21 0.84 0.30 0.08 0.27 
  Binomial p  0.01 0.47 0.04 0.02 0.51 1.00 0.79 0.13 1.00 
  Sample size  17 31 12 37  9  11 14  4 135 
CIBR – ToePrem (competing bid sub-sample)  
  Mean (%)  -1.15 -3.51 0.83 -10.48  -2.67 -8.32 -4.03 -1.26 -5.06 
  Median (%)  -0.62 -1.74 -7.04 -5.74 -1.64 -5.60 -3.14 4.47 -2.95 
  % positive  47.1 35.5 33.3 27.0 33.3 36.4 42.9 50.0 35.6 
 p-value of mean  0.67 0.04 0.92 0.00 0.26 0.12 0.19 0.89 0.00 
  Binomial p  1.00 0.15 0.39 0.01 0.51 0.55 0.79 1.00 0.00 
  Sample size  17 31 12 37  9  11 14  4 135 
IR
PSM – ToePrem (competing bid sub-sample)  
  Mean (%)  3.41 -0.25  14.78  -2.17 2.33 -7.55 2.73 -0.10 0.91 
  Median (%)  3.34 0.37 6.50 -1.13  -0.48  -5.24 2.98 5.06 0.56 
  % positive  58.8 54.8 75.0 48.6 44.4 45.5 57.1 50.0 54.1 
 p-value of mean  0.37 0.90 0.09 0.52 0.63 0.17 0.50 0.99 0.56 
  Binomial p  0.63 0.72 0.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.39 
  Sample size  17 31 12 37  9  11 14  4 135 
p-value of mean is the significance level for the Student’s t value that tests whether the mean is different from zero. 
Binomial p is the significance level for the two-tail Fisher sign test that tests whether the median is different from zero. 
The difference between value improvement and toehold-adjusted bid premium (ToePrem) is equal to the difference 
between the RHS and the LHS of equation (2) in the text. 
ToePrem = (1-alpha) * (bid premium) * Target market value/Combined bidder and target market value, where alpha 
is the fraction of pre-bid target shares held by the bidder. Table 10 
Sensitivity of IR
IM to alternative modeling specifications  
This table provides a sensitivity analysis for IR
IM, the value improvement as a result of the takeover, with respect to 
parameter values in several variations of the basic model.  Columns 1 and 2 describe the effects 
of varying K, the ratio of the expected post-takeover value of the target to the first bidder conditional on a competing 
bid arriving to the unconditional expected value.  Columns 3 and 4 vary γ , the probability that after failure the first 
bidder will seek and acquire an identical target.  Columns 5-7 vary Pr(S
2|θ3), the probability that a second bidder 
wins given that he enters the contest, in order to allow for the benefits derived by a defeated first bidder from selling 
his initial shareholding to a competing bidder.  Column 6 is based on the actual first bidder initial shareholding, and 
Column 7 is based on an initial shareholding of 0.15. Parameter inputs for computation of IR
IM are derived from 















1.00  14.8/13.8 0.0 14.8/13.8  0.0 14.8/13.8  13.2/12.1 
1.10  15.8/15.2 0.2 14.5/13.5  0.1 14.9/13.8  14.1/12.7 
1.20  17.5/16.9 0.4 14.3/14.1  0.3 15.3/14.2  15.7/14.1 
1.30  18.4/19.0 0.6 14.0/14.6  0.5 15.6/14.3  17.1/16.0 
1.40  19.0/20.8 1.0 13.4/14.3  0.7 15.9/14.8  18.5/18.2 
  
 